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*3 I. Introduction
  It seems almost comical to even be analyzing the question, "Is tax the practice of 
law?"  Tax practice is based on statutes and regulations and requires in-depth 
analysis to form an opinion on a tax issue.  However, because of economic and 
political reasons, neither the courts, the legislatures, nor the practitioners seem 
to be able to answer this question.
  Federal taxation in the United States is founded upon the very long and 
complicated Internal Revenue Code. [FN1]  It is supported and explained by a mind-
numbing number of regulations, both legislative and interpretive, and other 
administrative agency rulings and procedures that are only surpassed in their sheer 
volume by their complexity. [FN2]  Tax professionals must read, interpret, research, 
write opinion letters on, and defend clients before an administrative agency and 
ultimately before courts of original jurisdiction and courts of appeals. [FN3]  It 
is hard to imagine that anyone would flunk this question if given as a law school 
final essay.  It seems to be a textbook definition of the practice of law.
  There are not enough lawyers who want to or are competent to practice tax law, and 
yet tax law affects every American every year.  While tax is arguably the practice 
of law, we have to let some nonlawyers practice or there simply will not be 
representation for everyone who needs it.  However, state courts remain divided as 
to when practicing tax constitutes the practice of law. [FN4]
  The Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) have long claimed that the Supreme Court 
in Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar [FN5] gave the Secretary of the Treasury 
the right to say who practices before the IRS, and the Secretary of the Treasury has 
given CPAs that *4 right.  That is not correct. [FN6]  The Secretary of the Treasury 
stated that CPAs could come before the IRS to practice accounting (e.g. explain the 
financial statements they had prepared) but nothing contained in the Code of Federal 
Regulations was to be construed to allow a nonlawyer to practice law. [FN7]  Either 
the CPAs did not read that part or chose to ignore it, which alone should be a 
statement about their ability to practice law.
  Conflict between the two professions is not new.  In the late 1940s, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) held a joint conference to decide what accountants and lawyers could do in 
the area of tax. [FN8]  The tasks were nicely defined [FN9] and lines drawn between 
the professions were clear.  However, now CPAs are practicing tax law with renewed 
vigor. [FN10]
  Specifically, in the 1990s, the Texas Bar Association launched two investigations 
against Arthur Andersen and Deloitte and Touche alleging the unauthorized practice 
of law, and actually filed a formal complaint against Arthur Andersen. [FN11]  The 
complaint against Andersen was eventually dropped, and since no report was issued, 
the reasons for the complaint may never be known. [FN12]  However, the consequences 
of prevailing on such a claim would be staggering.  If the state bar associations 
won they would be restraining *5 hundreds of thousands of CPAs from practicing. 
[FN13] Although this would be appropriate because only lawyers should practice tax, 
to whom would all those tax clients go?
  CPAs now engage in the most complex areas of tax planning, estate planning, and 
entity formation.  They draft documents, and sometimes, just to pacify bar 
associations, hire attorneys to do the drafting. [FN14]
  In response to the strong CPA lobby, Congress, in 1998, gave taxpayers a  
"privilege" that allows taxpayers to consult with qualified tax advisors in the same 
manner that they would consult with tax lawyers. [FN15]  Suddenly, the federal 
courts found themselves deciding tax was the practice of law (if so the privilege 
would apply). [FN16]  Even though the state courts had already ruled tax was the 
practice of law, federal courts were now called upon to interpret a federal statute. 
[FN17]  It appeared to be a federal supremacy issue and the courts proceeded 
headlong to determine that generally, tax was not the practice of law and thus, CPAs 
had no privilege. [FN18]
  The state supreme courts, for political or economic reasons of their own, issued 
some interesting law.  Some states' legislatures had enacted statutes prohibiting 
the unauthorized practice of law, despite the fact that many of those states' 
highest courts had reserved *6 the right to regulate the practice of law. [FN19]  
This legislation led to problems, as some nonlawyers who were prosecuted under those 
statutes raised the issue of whether the statutes were unconstitutional. [FN20]  
These cases forced the courts between a rock and a hard place: Either invalidate the 
offending statute (but exonerate the guilty nonlawyer who may have harmed the public 
by his/her unlawful acts) or accept the statute as valid (either by delegation, 
waiver of their power, or by some other questionable logical gymnastics). [FN21]
  Unfortunately, the piecemeal treatment of the unauthorized practice cases resulted 
in a double standard by sometimes allowing nonlawyers to handle some "nonlegal" 
areas of practice (e.g. real estate closings, third party adjusting, or tax) but, on 
the other hand, holding licensed lawyers to regulations under the courts' ethical 
rules. [FN22]  Nonlawyers could solicit business, use questionable billing 
practices, [FN23] and generally were not required to obtain any degree of competency 
before representing the public.
  Further, any impact on federal tax law also affects other non-tax areas of law.  
For example, the federal courts of appeal are deeply split now on whether attorney's 
contingency fees should be first taxed to the client and then again to the attorney. 
[FN24]  This situation *7 could put many plaintiffs in the dire position of owing 
more in taxes than they recovered.  In addition family lawyers cannot just rely on 
state family law statutes because many aspects of divorce carry serious tax 
consequences and could render an equitable or equal division anything but. [FN25]  
Despite this pressure on attorneys to learn and know tax, the ABA has chosen to 
practically ignore tax in the required courses for attorneys. [FN26]
Although current case law is divided regarding when an accountant is practicing 
law, this Article will explore different approaches to this problem.  Specifically, 
Part II of this Article explores which entities control the regulation of the legal 
profession.  Next, Part III examines the impact of the state courts on the issue of 
unauthorized legal practice.  Part IV touches on the related issue of privilege and 
the treatment of the attorney-client privilege in the context of tax practice.  
Further, Part V considers whether tax practice should be considered the practice of 
law, and Part VI of this Article examines the legal profession's obligation to 
regulate the practice of law.  Finally, Part VII proposes new educational 
requirements and the establishment of a tax bar to assure the public of some minimum 
standard of education and competency in the area of taxation.
II. Who Controls the Practice of Law
A. Regulation of the Practice of Law - Separation of Powers
  The determination of legal rights (e.g. personal freedom, property rights, etc.) 
is so fundamental to the fiber of human existence, that the regulation by the state 
of the practice of law which determines these rights is deemed critical. [FN27]  The 
state has a significant interest in regulating the practice of law and protecting 
its citizens from being misled. [FN28] The U.S. Supreme Court has held that states 
have "a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within *8 the State." 
[FN29]  However, because the practice of law not only determines legal rights, but 
also is involved with the administration of justice, it is the state courts, not the 
legislatures, that regulate the profession. [FN30]  Thus, even though the 
legislatures may pass licensing laws, which presumably determine the rights of 
individuals to perform certain functions, these laws may not supersede or interfere 
with the power of the courts to regulate the practice of law. [FN31]  "[T]he courts 
. . . ultimately decide whether certain undisputed activities constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law." [FN32]
  Allowing the Legislature to pass laws regarding the practice of law is a violation 
of the separation of powers. [FN33]  Outside of the checks and balances provided for 
in the Constitution, regulation and control of each branch's power is, and should 
be, left to that branch. [FN34]  Allowing the Legislature to license and control 
attorneys would be like allowing the Chief Executive to have control over the hiring 
of legislative aides or committee staff.  Both of these are an infringement into the 
balance of powers and should create grave concerns.
  However, a comprehensive definition of just what qualifies as the practice of law 
is "impossible," and "each case must be decided upon its own particular facts." 
[FN35]  The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
    The practice of law is so affected with the public interest that the state has 
both a right and a duty to control and regulate it in order to promote the public 
welfare. . . . It is the attorney who first sits as *9 judge of the merits of every 
case, who decides whether or not suit should be commenced.  The court and the public 
are interested in having that decision rendered by those qualified so to do. . . . 
The public is directly concerned with the functioning of the machinery set up for 
the purpose of handling judicial work. [FN36]
B. Who Determines Who Practices in Federal Courts
  It should be noted, however, that state courts do not have authority to control 
who can practice in federal court. [FN37]  "Where federal law authorizes an agent to 
practice before a federal tribunal, the federal law preempts a state's licensing 
requirements to the extent that they are contrary to federal law." [FN38]  
Generally, federal courts have undisputed authority to regulate those practicing 
before them, including decisions on admission and discipline. [FN39]  Moreover, 
federal courts have the power to determine how its business is conducted provided 
that the rules adhere to rules of procedure and acts of Congress. [FN40]
  Thus, state courts have the right to determine what is the unauthorized practice 
of law in state courts, but federal courts have that right when it comes to federal 
courts.  In addition, according to the Supreme Court, the Legislature cannot pass 
legislation determining who can practice before the federal courts.  This leaves 
open the question of whether Congress may dictate rules of conduct for the courts.
  In Ippolito v. Florida, [FN41] plaintiffs were not licensed attorneys but wanted 
to practice law. [FN42]  Plaintiffs sued the State of Florida, the Florida Supreme 
Court, the Florida Bar, the Second District Court of Appeals and its judges, various 
attorneys, and other defendants. [FN43]  Plaintiffs were associated with several 
non-profit organizations, such as the Defenders of Life and Property Inc., and the 
Pro *10 Se Litigants of America Inc., which represented clients who were unlicensed, 
non-members of the Florida Bar. [FN44]
  Plaintiffs claimed the following: (1) the bar failed to implement formal checks 
and balances and consisted of "a government within a government"; (2) the state 
legislature assigned the Florida Supreme Court, one of the three branches of 
government, quasi-legislative authority contrary to the State Constitution of 
Florida; (3) allowing the judiciary to regulate the practice violated the doctrine 
of separation of powers by encroaching on the traditional role of the legislature; 
(4) the Florida Supreme Court failed to have the "inherent power" to both regulate 
its members and operate as a regulatory body; (5) the Florida Supreme Court did not 
have the power to enforce a regulatory scheme upon non-members because it was not 
able to regulate its own members; (6) non-members were denied their "constitutional 
right to practice law" without due process because the bar prohibited them from 
practicing law; and (7) in its action the Florida Supreme Court created an 
enterprise which allowed the Florida Bar to engage in racketeering activities with 
attorneys and judges that deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. [FN45]
  In addressing the issues, the court stated the following: 
   In only a century, the world has changed remarkably and so has the law.  Without 
a minimum level of expertise in the practice of law, *11 it is unlikely that an 
average person could effectively prepare a case for trial, appear in court, and make 
an effective argument before a judge or a jury. Unskilled laymen attempting to argue 
their own case, or on behalf of another, would be inordinately disadvantaged.  For 
these reasons, the Bar has become an indispensable component of the modern legal 
system.
  . . . . 
  An essential part of practicing law is knowledge of the substantive law--the law 
which creates and defines a party's cause of action.  Like the procedural aspects of 
law, the substantive law has grown significantly over the years. The law's 
proliferation has caused several problems for laymen and attorneys alike.  As the 
law expands, it becomes difficult for attorneys with skilled staffs to maintain 
their expertise and to stay abreast of changes in the law. As a result, managing the 
law's growth requires superior research skills. . . . For these reasons, the State 
of Florida requires law students to graduate from an accredited three-year graduate 
program of legal study, pass a detailed background examination, and complete a two 
day examination testing several areas of substantive law, procedural law, and 
ethics.  These minimum entrance requirements are necessary to provide the public 
with capable and effective legal representation.  For the reasons that follow, the 
State of Florida sets basic standards for and regulates applicants seeking admission 
to the legal profession because during the course of representing a client, an 
attorney may cause a client to relinquish his life, liberty or property. [FN46]
  The separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution implicitly provides that for 
the judiciary to be truly independent and separate they must have the power to 
prescribe rules and enforce these rules for both members and nonmembers. [FN47]  The 
court in Ippolito also noted: 
    [T]he courts are the forum for resolving conflicts.  In this forum, attorneys 
serve as advocates of the citizens.  In many instances an attorney opposes 
adversaries who are agents of other co-equal branches.  Thus, an independent 
judiciary is essential to protect individual citizens from abuse of power by 
governmental actors.  In this *12 respect alone, the practice of law is quite 
different from other professions.  Also unlike accountants and other professionals, 
an attorney is an officer of the court, having duties that extend beyond loyalty to 
the client.  As such, attorneys have a responsibility to the court and the public. 
[FN48]
  The court further noted the judiciary should regulate the practice of law in order 
to maintain the integrity, independence, and autonomy of the judiciary. [FN49]  
Otherwise, if the legislature were to regulate, "ethical issues would become 
political issues." [FN50]  Additionally, the stature of the judiciary as an 
independent branch of government would be lost. [FN51]  The court argued, "the legal 
profession would become less of a profession and more of a business association 
which would serve only the self-interest of lawyers while ignoring the public 
interest." [FN52]
  "There is no vested right in an individual to practice law." [FN53]  As the 
Supreme Court noted, if there is a right, it is the Court's right "to protect 
itself, and hence society, as an instrument of justice." [FN54] Courts have 
traditionally asserted their inherent power over those persons that practice before 
them, and have punished the unauthorized practice of law as contempt of court. 
[FN55]
  However, Utah, has taken a different interpretation. [FN56]  In a 1985 amendment 
to Article VIII of the Utah Constitution, the exclusive authority for the regulation 
of the practice of law was vested in the Utah Supreme Court. [FN57]  In 1997, the 
Utah Supreme Court heard a *13 case regarding the unauthorized practice of law. 
[FN58]  Petersen was a paralegal who was meeting and counseling with clients, 
drafting documents and pleadings, and conducting legal research for clients for a 
fee. [FN59]  He was convicted of violating Section 78-51-25 of the Utah Code which 
provides that only licensed attorneys can practice law. [FN60]
  In an interesting twist, Petersen argued that the 1985 amendment of  Article VIII 
of the Utah Constitution granted the Utah Supreme Court the exclusive authority to 
regulate the practice of law, and thus, the statute violated the separation of 
powers doctrine and was unconstitutional. [FN61]
  Petersen's conduct was obviously and blatantly the unauthorized practice of law.  
However, because the action against him was brought under a statute, [FN62] rather 
than in response to a rule promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court governing the 
unauthorized practice of law, the Supreme Court found itself in the awkward position 
of having to reverse his conviction or to uphold the conviction and somehow fix the 
technicality and find the code section valid. [FN63]
  In a surprising opinion, the Utah Supreme Court held that the authority granted to 
it by the Utah Constitution only allowed it to regulate the authorized practice of 
law, not the unauthorized practice of law. [FN64] Thus, it held, it could only 
regulate those people admitted to practice law. [FN65]  Since it did not have the 
authority to regulate nonattorneys, that power was held by the legislature. [FN66]  
The Utah Supreme Court held that it did not have the authority to regulate 
nonattorneys practicing law. [FN67]  Presumably, a nonattorney who showed up in 
court to represent a client could do so and the court could do nothing about it.
*14 Taking its newfound power for a spin, the Utah Legislature decided in 2004 
that the practice of law only includes practice before a court. [FN68] Utah now 
finds itself in the awkward position of having its supreme court and its bar 
association having to "negotiate" with the legislature to get back some of the 
practice of law. [FN69]  Since the court refused to use the power granted to it 
pursuant to the constitutional amendment, the legislature took the initiative. 
[FN70]
  Utah's professional licensing statute grants to CPAs the power to prepare tax 
returns and give tax advice. [FN71]  Since the giving of tax advice is the practice 
of law, this statute should be unconstitutional because it violates the separation 
of powers doctrine.  However, the Utah Supreme Court appears to have taken the 
position that the legislature can pass whatever laws it wants regarding the practice 
of law by nonattorneys. [FN72]  Interestingly, Utah now has two conflicting laws: 
one giving CPAs the grant of authority to practice law in the area of tax, and 
another proscribing the practice of law by a nonattorney. [FN73]  The supreme court 
has presumably backed out of the battle since CPAs are not attorneys. [FN74]  Thus, 
unless the Utah Supreme Court decides to reverse itself and resume control, 
attorneys and the courts will always be at the mercy of the Utah Legislature as to 
what does and does not constitute the practice of law. [FN75]
  The Florida Supreme Court in Ippolito stated: 
*15 The reasons espoused for regulating accountants are similar to those 
advanced for regulating attorneys.  Similar to the legal profession, modern business 
practices have changed and so has the accounting profession.  For some business 
owners and families, professionals other than accountants can provide reliable and 
inexpensive bookkeeping, and, to some extent, tax planning.  For services beyond 
that, an accountant or certified public accountant is required.  As business has 
become more complex, many people, even those with modest incomes, require accounting 
services.  Because nonaccountants can provide services at a lower cost, many 
customers prefer nonaccountants for needed services.
  By regulating accountants and establishing a minimum level of competence, the 
legislature protects the public welfare by providing a capable pool of accountants.  
Through licensing, accountants, in whom the public places its sacred trust, are 
required to adhere to rigid ethical standards, and when a licensed accountant 
violates those established standards, the state may impose sanctions.  Regulation 
allows the public welfare to flourish because it requires professionals to remain 
accountable to the state.
  Without the State of Florida setting basic standards for admission, professionals-
-by their misconduct--would cause irreparable harm to clients and third parties. . . 
. [FN76]
  It is noticeable, that the Florida Supreme Court apparently determined that tax is 
not necessarily the practice of law in allowing accountants to advise in this area. 
[FN77]
  Arizona took a slightly different approach in In re Creasy. [FN78]  Creasy was a 
disbarred attorney who began to work for his wife, a licensed insurance adjuster, 
representing clients. [FN79]  The Arizona Supreme Court held that it had continuing 
jurisdiction over the authorized and unauthorized practice of law, at least with 
respect to former members of the bar. [FN80]
*16 Enforcement of existing prohibitions is undertaken by state bar organizations; 
unauthorized practice committees of a state, county, or local bar organizations. 
[FN81]  California has taken the position that if one were ever a bar member, they 
must be active and pay dues or they cannot even do what other nonattorneys can do. 
[FN82]  Presumably, California believes that activities such as title work and 
working for the court constitute the practice of law and are allowed to be done by 
nonattorneys, but not by inactive attorneys. [FN83]  Interestingly, if you give up 
your bar license in California, as a former attorney, you are then allowed to 
perform these functions. [FN84]
  Instead of providing a definition of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of 
law, the courts have chosen to shape a definition by their decisions on a case by 
case basis. [FN85]  Therefore, to gain an understanding of the parameters of the 
unauthorized practice of law in the area of taxation, it is necessary to review 
these cases.
III. State Courts on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
  Practice in the area of taxation creates an interesting anomaly.  To the lay 
public, tax practice is within the purview of an accountant.  Even attorneys and 
judges go to their accountant for tax advice and preparation.  However, the courts 
have long held the field of taxation to be a field of law. [FN86] Thus, the practice 
of taxation by nonlawyers has been held is the unauthorized practice of law. [FN87] 
*17 Despite the court's position, accountants and other non-legal professionals 
continue to practice in this field, and look for ways to expand and enlarge the
scope of their practice.
  "Tax practice," itself is a rather open-ended term.  It covers four main areas of 
representation:
  • tax return preparation;
  • tax planning (including personal, business, international, and estate planning);
  • tax controversies - representation of clients before the I.R.S.; and
  • tax controversies - before the courts. [FN88]
  The following review is intended to give the reader an overview of the court-
established parameters of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in 
taxation.
A. Preparation of Tax Returns
  The justification for allowing nonlawyers to prepare pre-printed forms for others 
may trace its roots to a 1950 A.L.R. entry, which argued: 
    While a degree of familiarity with tax law is a requisite for making out self-
assessing tax returns, these are generally regarded as primarily informative in 
character and not of the nature of strict legal instruments, which establish, limit, 
or terminate rights and liabilities.  Consequently, the courts hold that their 
preparation, especially those of the simpler sort, is open to the laity. [FN89]
  Whatever may have been the truth in 1950, these arguments seem ridiculous today.  
There are over 120 million taxpayers who file each year, and the IRS reports that 
over sixty-percent use a paid preparer. [FN90]  Each year Congress changes the laws, 
and no layperson can hope to keep up with the complexity of changes.
*18 Another court has adopted the idea that it is acceptable for nonattorneys to 
prepare documents for a client, but they have discarded the rationale that if 
judgment were involved, the preparer was engaged in the practice of law. [FN91]  
This holding is unsupportable because it tells us that nonlawyers can prepare
complicated legal documents, regardless of the degree of skill or judgment necessary 
to adequately complete the forms. [FN92]
  The IRS is a government police agency. [FN93]  Preparing a 1040 actually means 
making disclosures to the government on behalf of a client, making elections as to 
how the law will treat a client, and testifying that those disclosures and decisions 
were the correct ones and were honestly reported, since the form is executed "under 
penalty of perjury." [FN94]
  Preparation of tax returns is one big exception to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
of freedom from self-incrimination. [FN95]  Disclosures and elections made on tax 
returns can result in either civil or criminal penalty, yet millions of Americans 
each year turn to nonlawyers to help them wade through the complexity of forms that, 
if nothing else, require huge amounts of skill and judgment in an arcane area of 
law. [FN96]
  1. Statutory Restrictions
  In Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Libutti, [FN97] the state bar association sought to 
enjoin a public accountant from preparing income tax returns. [FN98]  A state 
statute limited return preparers to members of the bar, CPAs, or members of the 
American Institute of Accountants. [*19 FN99] The bar association also contended 
that the accountant, in preparing returns for those taxpayers whose income is less 
than $5,000, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. [FN100]  The court 
decided the case on the statutory grounds and did not reach the issue of whether 
preparation of these more complex returns was the practice of law. [FN101]
  Comparatively, another court has held that certain statutory provisions, 
restricting the class of persons eligible to prepare income tax returns for 
compensation to CPAs and attorneys, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. [FN102]  
Presumably, at least one court would disagree. [FN103]
  2. Simple Tax Returns
  It is acknowledged that a degree of familiarity with the tax law is required for 
filling out tax returns. [FN104]  However, despite this acknowledged "need to know," 
if a nonlawyer does tax work relying on his interpretation of this knowledge, it is 
the unauthorized practice of law. [FN105]
  It is permissible for a layperson to prepare tax returns. [FN106]  In Blair v. 
Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, Inc., [FN107] the court stated that the forms furnished 
by the State and Federal Revenue bureaus are "not definitive in character nor do 
they vest legal rights" and are also easily amendable and largely informative. 
[FN108]  The court, the *20 defendants are "little more than skilled amanuenses, 
doing what an intelligent man could do for himself and what would be given to 
another to do only by someone who has little acquaintance with business routine and 
accounting technique." [FN109]  The court concluded that tax return preparations are 
acceptable but when a "doubtful question arises which requires the construction of a 
statute or the consideration of a decision, the problem calls for a lawyer's 
solution." [FN110]
  In an interesting twist, although tax preparation is not necessarily the practice 
of law and may be done by a nonlawyer, at least one state has held that when it is 
done by a licensed lawyer it is the practice of law. [FN111]  In Commission on 
Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Mahoney, [FN112] the Iowa Supreme Court indicated 
while tax preparation and labor negotiations do not always constitute the practice 
of law, when completed by a licensed attorney they are the practice of law. [FN113]
*21 Conversely in United States v. Willis, [FN114] despite evidence which clearly 
showed that preparation of tax returns was an integral part of a lawyer's practice, 
the trial judge felt constrained by the Eighth Circuit's scrivener dictum [FN115] in 
Canaday v. United States, [FN116] and held that preparation of tax returns by a 
lawyer was not the performance of a legal service. [FN117]
  On July 7, 1985, the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 85-352. [FN118]  That opinion is clear 
recognition by the ABA that preparation of income tax returns is a part of the 
practice of law which, along with other aspects of the legal profession, requires 
adherence to the ethical standards of conduct applicable to all attorneys in civil 
matters. [FN119]  Formal Opinion 85-352 makes it clear that the lawyer who prepares 
tax returns must make a legal evaluation and judgment that the position being taken 
in the return would stand a realistic possibility of success if the matter is 
litigated. [FN120]
  One court reasoned that when an attorney performs a service, which can be done by 
a layman, he still has an obligation to perform the type of work the professional 
standards require of him in the practice of law. [FN121]  If he identifies a legal 
problem while performing *22 such a service, he must address the problem, even 
though a layman in the same situation could not do so. [FN122]  Therefore, because 
an attorney is licensed to practice law, professional services done by him are 
always done in the capacity of an attorney. [FN123]  The court also reasoned that 
many people seek an attorney to do this type of professional service because they 
believe it will be done better by an attorney. [FN124]
  Similarly, Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Agee [FN125] was a disciplinary proceeding 
against an Ohio attorney who split fees with a layman. [FN126] There the Ohio 
Supreme Court stated: "There are many areas in which personal services do not 
constitute the practice of law when done by a layman but which are the practice of 
law when performed by an attorney, e.g., work in the fields of income tax and 
trademarks." [FN127]
  Alternatively in Gardner v. Conway, [FN128] the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
the resolution of "difficult or doubtful legal questions" by an accountant hired to 
prepare tax returns constituted the unauthorized practice of the law. [FN129]  The 
court, however, noted that the preparation of the tax returns, at least when done by 
an accountant, did not itself constitute the practice of law. [FN130]
  Additionally, in State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Butterfield,  [FN131] 
the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the preparation, by a suspended attorney, of 
"deeds, mortgages, releases, and income tax returns during the period of his 
suspension . . . is properly identified as the practice of law, whether or not it 
might under some circumstances be properly performed by others not admitted to the 
bar." [FN132]
*23 Moreover, in Librarian v. State Bar, [FN133] an attorney was suspended for 
violating the rules on solicitation because he placed signs on his home advertising 
income tax return and notary services. [FN134]  The California Superior Court held 
if a person is licensed to practice law, any professional service he renders, 
whether some of those services may be performed by a professional licensed in 
another capacity, are considered to be performed in his capacity as an attorney. 
[FN135]  A person may be licensed to practice law but must abide by the standards of 
professional conduct regardless of the capacity in which he is acting. [FN136]
  Preparation of even the simplest tax return may, in fact, establish legal rights.  
Elections may be made simply by filing the return or failure to affirmatively make 
an election. [FN137]  Admissions may be made through the filing of a return.  
Further, Congress has imposed penalties, both civil and criminal, for various 
violations and failures to comply in the preparation of the return. [FN138]  Despite 
the fact that rights may be determined by simply filing a return, the nonlawyers may 
fill out tax returns as long as no "doubtful question arises which requires the 
construction of a statute or the consideration of a decision." [FN139]  Presumably, 
as long as the tax preparer does not know that the question is doubtful or requires 
the construction of a statute or the consideration of a decision, he can prepare the 
return.
*24 3. Tax Advice Unrelated to Preparing the Tax Return
  Generally, the courts permit nonlawyers to prepare simple tax returns and to 
answer incidental questions of law in connection with the preparation of those 
returns. [FN140]  However, nonlawyers are not allowed, as a separate service, to 
render opinions regarding questions or interpretation of tax laws based on an 
examination of authorities or give tax counsel regarding a course of action that 
will result in tax savings. [FN141]
  In Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, [FN142] a local bar association brought a petition 
before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts to enjoin nonlawyers from giving legal 
advice regarding taxation and the preparation of income tax returns. [FN143]  One of 
the respondents included an attorney who owned American Tax Services, an 
unincorporated business engaged in preparing individual income tax returns on a high 
volume basis. [FN144]  He, however, spent little time in the business. [FN145]  
Other respondents included the wife of the owner, who devoted all of her time to the 
business, and a general manager. [FN146]  The general manager was an accountant. 
[FN147]  The court stated that the examination of statutes, judicial decisions, and 
departmental rulings, with the intent of advising upon an inquiry relative to 
taxation and followed by a rendering of an opinion on that issue, are part of the 
practice of law. [FN148]  However, the preparation of tax returns on income derived 
principally from wages or salary is not the practice of law. [FN149]  In contrast, 
the undertaking, without initial charge, to negotiate with tax officials over any 
controversy that might arise in a given return did constitute the practice of law. 
[FN150]  Further, the court stated that the commencement of legal proceedings in 
court in cases related to taxes is exclusively reserved to lawyers. [FN151]
*25 Ultimately, the court found that respondents did not engage in the practice of 
law. [FN152]  The court decided the case based on the simplicity of the returns 
prepared by the respondents, explaining that the respondents filled out simple 
income tax returns that "can readily be filled out by any intelligent taxpayer . . . 
who has the patience to study the instructions." [FN153]
  Comparatively, in the landmark Bercu case, [FN154] a New York appellate court 
found an accountant guilty of the unauthorized practice of law while giving tax 
advice. [FN155]  The taxpayer company had not paid city sales and use taxes during a 
period in which its business was unprofitable. [FN156] In a later year in which it 
had made a large profit, the company wanted to settle a tax obligation, providing it 
could take the deduction on its federal income tax return for the profitable year. 
[FN157]
  The company's regular accountant, who was also an attorney, had rendered an 
opinion based upon a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, that the payments would 
have to be accrued back to the years they were incurred. [FN158]  The taxpayer then 
consulted Bercu. [FN159]
  Bercu, an accountant, conducted his own research and gave an opinion that the 
payments could be deducted in the profitable year. [FN160]  He was not employed as 
an auditor or accountant for the client, nor for work on its books or tax returns. 
[FN161]
  The court held Bercu in contempt for providing legal services apart from his 
normal accounting work. [FN162]  However, the court intimated that when an 
accountant deals with a question of law which is only incidental to preparing a tax 
return, he is not engaged in the *26 unauthorized practice of law. [FN163]  This 
practice became known as the incidental test. [FN164]
  It is interesting to note that in Bercu, the initial proceeding arose when Bercu 
had sued for fees. [FN165]  The unauthorized practice of law issue was raised as a 
defense to having to pay the fees. [FN166]
  4. Tax Advice Incidental to Preparing the Tax Return
  In Agran v. Shapiro, [FN167] the California Superior Court rejected the incidental 
activity test of Bercu and ruled that an accountant may not give legal advice or do 
legal work even in connection with his regular work as an accountant in tax matters.
[FN168]  The court stated: 
    It appears to be generally conceded that it is within the proper function of a 
public accountant, although not a member of the bar, to prepare federal income tax 
returns, except perhaps in those instances where substantial questions of law arise 
which may competently be determined only by a lawyer. . . . [The IRS took the 
position that the] loss did not constitute a "net operating loss" within the meaning 
of the "carry back" provision of the statute.  At this stage no question of 
accounting was involved.  Neither the fact that the loss had been sustained nor the 
manner in which it arose was questioned.  The only question was whether, under the 
admitted facts, the loss was one which could be "carried back," the answer to which 
depended upon whether or not it was a loss attributable to the operation of a trade 
or business regularly carried on by the taxpayer" within the meaning of that phrase 
as used in the Internal Revenue Code, section 122(d) *27 (5), 26 U.S.C.A. ß  122(d) 
(5).  We see no escape from the conclusion that under the circumstances this 
question was purely one of law. [FN169]
  In Agran the plaintiff was an accountant who sued his client for fees. [FN170]  He 
had filed a tax return for his client in which he claimed a deduction for a loss. 
[FN171]  He then prepared a tentative carry-back of the loss to two preceding tax 
years. [FN172]  Subsequently, the plaintiff met with an IRS agent who disallowed the 
loss. [FN173]  Finally, the plaintiff researched the case law and presented his 
position to the IRS agent. [FN174]
  Questions of fact are seldom brought to the accountant. [FN175]  When the taxpayer 
comes to the accountant, it is not in an adversarial context.  All facts are 
generally admitted or at least assumed.  Clients consult accountants to apply the 
law to the facts.  Even the simplest 1040 is a series of legal conclusions. [FN176]  
Marital status, dependent status, whether earnings are really wages and whether 
items on a W-2 are includible or not are all legal conclusions. [FN177]  In fact, 
preparation of the Form W-2 itself calls for conclusions of law, which are not 
simple determinations. [FN178]
  Thus, under the Agran analysis, preparation of even a simple tax return might 
constitute the practice of law. [FN179]  Further, from the *28 cases which concern 
the giving of tax advice, it would appear that tax planning is definitely the 
practice of law and should not be done by nonlawyers. [FN180]  In addition, any tax 
work before the IRS by nonlawyers that consists of researching and rendering 
opinions on the law constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. [FN181]
  In Agran the court indicated an accountant is required to conform his accounting 
skills to the law, and consequently must be knowledgeable about the law of 
accounting. [FN182]  Similarly, a lawyer must have a fair understanding of 
accounting. [FN183]  The court further noted: "If taxation is a hybrid of law and 
accounting, it does not follow that it is so wholly without the law that its legal 
activities may be pursued without proper qualifications and without court 
supervision." [FN184]
  Agran further noted that the Treasury Regulations allowing accountants to practice 
before the IRS do not allow non-members of the bar to perform acts constituting the 
practice of law. [FN185]  Since the regulations specifically state that nothing 
contained in them shall be construed to allow a nonlawyer to practice law, 
accountants may practice before the IRS, but only if the work they perform is 
strictly within the scope of accounting and not law. [FN186]  The work of the 
accountant is exempt only if it is "dissociated from legal advice." [FN187]
  However, conversely, in Gardner v. Conway, [FN188] the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that "[a]ny rule which holds that a layman *29 who prepares legal papers or 
furnishes other services of a legal nature is not practicing law when such services 
are incidental to another business or profession completely ignores the public 
welfare." [FN189]
  Nonetheless, the court in Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., [FN190] denied 
an accountant the recovery of a fee for advice given. [FN191]  It stated: 
    If plaintiff is allowed to recover, then an accountant may practice law without 
a license.  Any one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a 
statute, or gives information as to what judicial or quasi judicial tribunals are 
deciding, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. [FN192]
  5. Legal Advice by Accountants
  In 1943, a corporation offered to provide an interpretation and analysis of tax 
laws and statutes, recommendations regarding contract modifications, recommendations 
of clauses to be used in forms and in corporate resolutions, and review of clients' 
tax and legal status all with a view of achieving large tax savings. [FN193]  This 
action was held to be clearly the unauthorized practice of law and was not made any 
less so by the fact that the corporation suggested to its clients that they consult 
an attorney. [FN194]
  In a 1986 New Jersey case, the court held that CPAs are permitted to prepare and 
file estate inheritance tax returns without being considered as engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law, provided that they notify their clients in writing 
before commencing work and inform them review of the return by an attorney might be 
advisable because of legal principles that might be involved in the preparation of 
the return. [FN195]  Thus, the court acknowledged *30 that the preparation of the 
return dealt with legal issues, but allowed the client to assume the risk of having 
a nonlawyer do the work. [FN196]
  6. Permissible Actions by Accountants
  There are a few cases holding that giving tax advice, even though not incidental 
to another service, does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
  In Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co., [FN197] a corporate fiduciary furnished 
pamphlets to its customers which gave tax information and illustrations of ways to 
reduce tax liability and to prepare tax returns. [FN198]  This was found not to 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law. [FN199]  Generally, the sale of printed 
material, even when purporting to explain legal practices to the public, has not 
been held to be the practice of law. [FN200]  The courts are divided, however, on 
the question of whether the sale of "how to" kits constitutes the practice of law. 
[FN201]
  Additionally, in Elfenbein v. Luckenbach Terminals, Inc., [FN202] the court held 
that developing a plan of changing par value stock into nonpar stock and reducing 
the number of outstanding shares to *31 affect a tax savings did not constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law. [FN203]
  Further, a nonlawyer who offered to point out a loop hole in the Internal Revenue 
Code in exchange for a percentage of the savings was held, in High v. Trade Union 
Courier Publishing Corp., [FN204] not to be unlawfully practicing law. [FN205]
  Comparatively, in Zelkin v. Caruso Discount Corp., [FN206] the plaintiff, a CPA, 
represented taxpayers in contesting deficiency assessments by the IRS. [FN207]  The 
plaintiff testified that he had performed research at two law libraries and reviewed
the original reserve agreement. [FN208]  The plaintiff contended, however, that his 
research was directed toward a determination of proper accounting methods employed 
by taxpayers in similar factual settings. [FN209]  The defendant, citing Agran, 
asserted that the plaintiff's services constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 
[FN210] The Zelkin court negated this argument by emphasizing that in Agran the 
accountant testified that he not only "cited numerous cases to the Internal Revenue 
agent" but also spent days reading and reviewing applicable law. [FN211]  However, 
in the case at hand, the plaintiff neither read the law nor cited any cases to the 
Internal Revenue agent. [FN212]  Consequently, the panel found the defendant's 
argument to be unfounded. [FN213]
  In addition, the Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to adopt rules proposed 
by the South Carolina Bar which would have *32 restricted the ability of laypersons, 
including CPAs, to practice before state agencies and the probate court. [FN214]  
The rules would have also restricted CPAs in the practice of tax. [FN215]  The court 
stated: 
    [O]ur respect for the rigorous professional training, certification and 
licensing procedures, continuing education requirements, and ethical code required 
of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) convinces us that they are entitled to 
recognition of their unique status. . . . We are confident that allowing CPAs to 
practice in their areas of expertise, subject to their own professional regulation, 
will best serve to both protect and promote the public interest. [FN216]
  Notably, even the U.S. Supreme Court has presumed that nonlawyers could provide 
tax advice. [FN217]  The Court heard a case in which an executor relied upon an 
attorney to file an estate tax return. [FN218]  Because of a clerical error, the 
attorney failed to file the return on time. [FN219] Consequently, the executor filed 
a lawsuit premised on the attorney's error to recover penalties assessed for the 
untimely filing. [FN220]  The Court held that a taxpayer's reliance on an attorney 
to prepare and file a tax return does not constitute "reasonable cause" for the late 
filing. [FN221]  The Court went on to stress that "[i]t requires no special training 
or effort to ascertain a deadline and make sure that it is met." [FN222]  In an 
effort to explain their holding and probably without much consideration for the 
impact of their words on the issue of whether tax is the practice of law, the Court 
stated: "When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, 
such as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on 
that advice.  Most taxpayers are *33 not competent to discern error in the 
substantive advice of an accountant or attorney." [FN223]
  7. Sarbanes-Oxley
  On October 16, 2001, Enron Inc. announced a $638 million loss for the third 
quarter, and Wall Street reduced the value of stockholders' equity by $1.2 billion. 
[FN224]  Later that year, Enron announced that earnings over the past four years had 
been overstated by $586 million and that it had up to $3 billion in debt obligations 
to various partnerships. [FN225]  A $23 billion merger deal fell through, and 
Enron's debt was downgraded to junk-bond status. [FN226]
  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [FN227] is probably the most important legislation 
affecting accounting, auditing, financial reporting, and professional services firms 
since the securities and exchange laws of the early 1930s.  Section 201(a) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act adds a new section, 10A(g), to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. [FN228]  Basically, it is unlawful for a registered public accounting firm 
that performs an audit of an issuer's financial statements (and any person 
associated with such a firm) to provide to that issuer, contemporaneously with the 
audit, any non-audit services, including the following nine categories: [FN229]
  (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial 
statements of the audit client;
  (2) financial information systems design and implementation;
  (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind 
reports;
  (4) actuarial services;
  (5) internal audit outsourcing services;
  (6) management functions or human resources;
*34 (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;
  (8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and
  (9) any other service that the Board [FN230] determines, by regulation, is 
impermissible. [FN231]
  Any non-audit service for an audit client, including tax services, that is not one 
of the prohibited nine may be rendered only if the activity is approved in advance 
by the audit committee of the issuer. [FN232]  That is, unless tax is considered a 
legal service.
  A big question then, is, are tax services prohibited as legal services?  The SEC 
indicated in a Release with respect to auditors the following: 
    The Commission's principles of independence with respect to services provided by 
auditors are largely predicated on three basic principles, violations of which would 
impair the auditor's independence: (1) an auditor cannot function in the role of 
management, (2) an auditor cannot audit his or her own work, and (3) an auditor 
cannot serve in an advocacy role for his or her client. [FN233]
  The Release, in addressing legal services, indicated the professional duty at its 
prime is to advance the clients' interests. [FN234]  This means, as defined in the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer while staying within the law must be zealous 
and diligent in their representation. [FN235]  Further, a lawyer must perform 
whatever legal and ethical duties he or she can do to advance the client's cause. 
[FN236]  Consequently, it is not possible for an individual to be both a legal 
advocate and an auditor for one company. [FN237]  This position has *35 been upheld 
by the Supreme Court, who has previously recognized the conflict that inherently 
exists for an individual attempting to be an auditor and an attorney for the same 
corporation. [FN238]  The Release further indicated: 
    The rules we are adopting are consistent with our proposal. Accordingly, an 
accountant is prohibited from providing to an audit client any service that, under 
circumstances in which the service is provided, could be provided only by someone 
licensed, admitted, or otherwise qualified to practice law in the jurisdiction in 
which the service is provided.
  We recognize that there may be implications for some foreign registrants from this 
rule. . . .  As a general matter, our rules are not intended to prohibit foreign 
accounting firms from providing services that an accounting firm in the United 
States may provide.  In determining whether or not a service would impair the 
accountant's independence solely because the service is labeled a legal service in a 
foreign jurisdiction, the Commission will consider whether the provision of the 
service would be prohibited in the United States as well as in the foreign 
jurisdiction. [FN239]
  Arguably, the Release appears to sanction the provision of tax services, however, 
the SEC does not indicate by whose standard that service would be prohibited. 
[FN240]  Thus, the issue is still not settled.
B. Tax and Estate Planning
  In New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, [FN241] respondents wrote, published, 
distributed and sold a book on avoiding probate. [FN242]  The New York Court of 
Appeals ultimately held that selling such a book was not the unauthorized practice 
of law. [FN243]
*36 In Stark County Bar Ass'n v. Beaman, [FN244] the court held that it was the 
unauthorized practice of law for a nonlawyer to give advice regarding the laws of 
probate of decedents' estates and the tax laws of Ohio and the United States, and to 
advise and counsel regarding the specific type of trust agreement that would be 
suitable in a given situation. [FN245]
C. Tax Controversies - Representation of Clients Before the Internal Revenue Service
  Currently, attorneys, accountants, enrolled agents, and others are allowed to 
practice before the IRS, according to Treasury Department Regulations. [FN246]  
Oddly enough, Section 10.32 of those rules provides that "nothing in the regulations 
in this part shall be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to 
practice law." [FN247]
  The California court in Agran pointed out that this statute allows accountants to 
practice only accounting before the IRS. [FN248]  Even the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Sperry pointed out that this language would be strictly construed as not allowing 
nonlawyers to practice law. [FN249]
  In Sperry, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case in which it determined whether 
practice before the Patent Office by nonlawyers constitutes the unauthorized 
practice of law. [FN250]  The Court found *37 that Congress recognized that the 
Commissioner of Patents had the following: 
    [The authority to] practice before the Patent Office by non-lawyers. . . . If 
the authorization is unqualified, then, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, Florida 
may not deny to those failing to meet its own qualifications the right to perform 
the functions within the scope of the federal authority. . . . [R]egistration in the 
Patent Office confers a right to practice before the Office without regard to 
whether the State within which the practice is conducted would otherwise prohibit 
such conduct. [FN251]
  The Court, however, emphasized that the regulations used the wording that 
registration "shall only entitle the persons registered to practice before the 
Patent Office." [FN252]  This wording was opposed to the predecessor provision which 
provided that registration "shall not be construed as authorizing persons not 
members of the bar to practice law." [FN253]  Thus, the Court left to the 
commissioner of an agency the discretion to supersede state law. [FN254]
  The Supreme Court further noted in Sperry that state law must yield to federal law 
when the two are incompatible. [FN255]  The Code of Federal Regulations further 
provides that "[n]othing in this part shall be construed to preempt the authority of 
each State to regulate the practice of law, except to the extent necessary for the 
Patent and Trademark Office to accomplish its federal objectives." [FN256] *38 Thus, 
the Supreme Court left the door open in Sperry for nonlawyers to practice before the
Patent and Trademark Office. [FN257]
  Two important things should be noted about this decision: (1) Under the current 
Code of Federal Regulations, enacted in 1985, only licensed attorneys and those 
agents who were admitted prior to 1957, are allowed to practice before the Patent 
and Trademark Office; [FN258] and (2) this case has been misquoted and misused as a 
grant of greater powers than actually provided. [FN259]
  Treasury Regulation Section 10.32 states that "[n]othing in the regulations 
[shall] be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to practice law." 
[FN260]  This is the specific language the Supreme Court stated would bar a 
nonlawyer from providing "legal" services. [FN261]
  Specifically, the California Superior Court in Agran came to the same conclusion 
when it held that nonlawyers could not perform acts before the IRS if those acts 
constituted the practice of law. [FN262]  What acts constitute the practice of law 
is determined by case law in the various states, which has drawn very narrow lines 
as to what an accountant may do.
*39 Further, giving advice to individuals under indictment for willful evasion of 
federal income tax was held to be the unauthorized practice of law where the 
individual advised the person of the nature of the charges and whether he should 
plead guilty. [FN263]  "[P]reparation of charters, by-laws, resolutions, and other 
documents incidental to the contractual rights of the corporation, its 
incorporators, and stockholders . . ." was found to constitute the practice of law. 
[FN264]  However, the cases are split on whether an accountant could recover for the 
fees for tax related work when other services performed constituted the unauthorized 
practice of law. [FN265]
  Generally, the unauthorized practice of law generally arises in the context of 
contempt, injunction, disciplinary action, or contractual conflicts.  However, in 
Goldenberg v. Comm'r, [FN266] the issue was whether a licensed attorney and CPA 
could deduct the cost of a law degree in taxation as a trade or business expense. 
[FN267]  The petitioner worked for the IRS prior to entering law school. [FN268]  
The court held that prior employment as an IRS revenue agent, appeals officer, or as 
a CPA did not constitute the practice of law. [FN269]  However, in Bancroft v. 
Indemnity Insurance Co., [FN270] the court held that an accountant's malpractice 
insurance policy covered liability for negligently rendered tax opinions despite the 
insurer's assertion that the insured was engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law. [FN271]
D. Tax Controversies - Representation of Clients Before the Courts
  Even though this type of representation would seem to be the quintessential 
definition of the "practice of law," the U.S. Tax Court, pursuant to its Rule 
200(a), allows nonlawyers to appear *40 and represent clients before it. [FN272]  
The other two trial courts which hear federal tax cases do not. [FN273]
E. Attorney Discipline
  Notably, attorneys who assist nonattorneys to practice law may be disciplined.  In 
Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Kathman, [FN274] attorney disciplinary proceedings were 
instituted for this reason. [FN275]  The Ohio Supreme Court held that a licensed 
attorney aids in the unauthorized practice of law when he or she assists nonlawyers 
to market or sell living trusts warranting a six month suspension. [FN276]  Thus, 
presumably, attorneys working in multi-disciplinary practices may be subject to 
disciplinary procedures for aiding in the unauthorized practice of law.
IV. The Federal Courts and Privilege
  The law regarding tax practice is further blurred by decisions involving the 
attorney-client privilege issue.  Cases involving the unauthorized practice of law 
predominately arise in state courts.  Unauthorized practice cases seldom arise in 
the federal court system since, generally, it is a state issue. Similarly, tax cases 
seldom arise in state courts since taxation is a federal issue.  Issues of privilege 
in the federal tax arena generally arise in the federal court system.  Thus, 
although the state courts may have ruled that tax is the practice of law for state 
law unauthorized practice issues, the federal courts have been deciding that tax is 
not the practice of law for privilege issues. [FN277]  There is a large body of 
federal case law involving the attorney-client privilege which discusses the nature 
of *41 legal services, and which has developed its own definition of the practice of 
law as it relates to tax. [FN278]
  Despite state case law holding that the rendering of legal advice is lawyer's 
work, several federal courts deciding the privilege issue have held that tax 
services or tax return preparation are accounting services, and hence not covered by 
attorney-client privilege. [FN279]  This is an easy way out of difficult privilege 
issues for the federal courts, but muddies the water for tax practitioners.
*42 A. Background
  The attorney-client privilege is the client's right to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications between the 
client and his or her attorney. [FN280]  The privilege is intended to ensure "full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients." [FN281]  Originally, 
the privilege was viewed as belonging to the attorney, but today the privilege is 
recognized as the client's. [FN282]  By promoting greater disclosure of relevant 
facts by the client, this privilege allows the attorney to provide legal advice that 
is more informed and, therefore, more effective. [FN283]
  Because the attorney-client privilege is "in derogation of the search for truth," 
[FN284] some courts have frequently given the privilege a narrow construction. 
[FN285]  After all, exercising the privilege means that the information sought 
cannot be obtained and thus, it acts as a shield and a cloak.
  The privilege is governed by substantive law, rather than procedural law.  [FN286]  
Thus, in federal cases based on diversity jurisdiction, privilege is generally 
determined in accordance with state law, [FN287] but in cases determining 
deficiencies in federal taxes, the federal common law applies. [FN288]  The 
privilege is not guaranteed by the Constitution, but comes instead from statute or 
common law. [FN289]
*43 Where information is revealed to the attorney for the purpose of disclosure to 
the government, waiver of the privilege is presumed. [FN290] Courts have held that 
tax returns and records in the hands of a taxpayer are not privileged from 
discovery. [FN291]  However, the courts have also held that great caution should be 
exercised in ordering the disclosure of tax returns. [FN292]  There is a judicially 
developed "'qualified' privilege . . . that disfavors the disclosure of income tax 
returns as a matter of general federal policy." [FN293]  A court must determine 
whether (1) the tax return is relevant to the subject matter in dispute; and (2) a 
compelling need exists for the return, because the information sought is not 
obtainable from other sources. [FN294]  While the party seeking discovery of the tax 
returns bears the burden of establishing its relevance, the resisting party has the 
task of identifying an alternative source for the information. [FN295]
  "[T]he privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the 
light of reason and experience." [FN296]  Common law has defined the attorney-client 
privilege as protecting only communications relating to an opinion of law, legal 
service, or aid in a legal proceeding. [FN297]  The privilege is held by and must be 
*44 claimed by a client, and limits the person receiving the privilege to a member 
of the bar of the court. [FN298]  There are several ways a client can waive his 
privilege. [FN299]
  Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, [FN300] the federal 
courts have struggled to define the "federal common law" on this subject. [FN301]  
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the Supreme Court's decisions 
in United States v. Euge [FN302] and Upjohn Co. v. United States, [FN303] make it 
clear that privileges in the federal courts are to be determined pursuant to federal 
common law. [FN304]  Rule 501 provides: 
    Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or 
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or 
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law 
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason 
and experience.  However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an 
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, 
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision 
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law. [FN305]
  Rule 501 governs issues of privilege in the federal courts. [FN306]  Thus, federal 
common law governs in federal question cases and state law governs in diversity 
suits. [FN307]  IRS summons are issued *45 under federal law, and the applicability 
of the attorney-client privilege is a federal question. [FN308]
  Common law did not extend the privilege of confidential communications to 
accountants. [FN309]  There are various reasons for courts' reluctance in allowing 
an accountant-client privilege. [FN310]  In general, privileges are disfavored under 
evidentiary principles because their effect is to prevent the use of relevant 
evidence. [FN311]  Thus, privileges should exist only within the narrowest possible 
limits and only when good reasons can be shown for their existence. [FN312]
  Another reason for the denial of the accountant-client privilege is the differing 
responsibilities of an attorney and an accountant. [FN313]  An attorney owes a duty 
of undivided loyalty to the client, an accountant, on the other hand, owes a duty 
not only to the client, but also to governmental agencies regulating the client's 
industry, and to the client's creditors and investors. [FN314]  Some courts have 
held that handing over records to an accountant comes with little expectation of 
privacy, but instead with the knowledge that the information *46 will be disclosed 
on the tax return. [FN315]  Only attorneys act as confidential advisers to their 
clients. [FN316]
  The concept of an accountant-client privilege is not foreign at the state level. 
[FN317]  In fact, more than half of the states have a privilege addressing the need 
for confidentiality between an accountant and a client. [FN318]  Only fourteen of 
the states have a privilege shielding advice an accountant gives a client in 
discovery. [FN319]  "Additionally, state statutes which grant a more expansive 
accountant-client privilege have consistently been interpreted by courts in a narrow 
manner." [FN320]  While states may be more receptive than federal government to the 
privilege, as the privilege provides for candid communication between the accountant 
and the client; however, it should not be thought that the privilege has been fully 
embraced. [FN321]
  Ultimately, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 
created a privilege for CPAs, enrolled agents and enrolled actuaries, similar to the 
privilege of confidentiality which attorneys currently enjoy. [FN322]  Consequently, 
Section 7525 was enacted to allow taxpayers to consult with qualified tax advisors 
in the same manner that they consult with tax lawyers. [FN323]  Section 7525 
provides the protections of confidentiality for "communication[s] between a taxpayer 
and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would 
be considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an 
attorney." [*47 FN324]  The "privilege" however, has met with mixed emotions.
B. The Debate over Privilege
  The accountant privilege has been criticized as an attempt to modify the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which provide that privilege in federal courts should be 
determined in accordance with the common law as interpreted by judicial decisions, 
not by legislative action. [FN325]  Opponents argue that the common law has 
established that no privilege for accountants exists, and any attempt to legislate 
the privilege is actually an attempt to circumvent common law. [FN326]  However, in 
light of a Utah District Court's ruling that "[a] federal court has the power to 
prescribe rules for the conduct of its business as long as the rules are consistent 
with the Acts of Congress and the rules of practice and procedure," presumably the 
legislature has that right. [FN327] 
    It is also an issue whether accountants are equipped to handle the 
responsibility which comes with privilege. . . . For example, the decision of 
whether to assert privilege is highly strategic, and may affect such things as 
whether a taxpayer has the burden of proof at trial (as the cooperation of the 
taxpayer, or lack thereof, could shift the burden).  This is a consequence an 
accountant may fail to consider, but that an attorney would likely take into 
consideration. [FN328]
  Accountants are not bound to the same duty of confidentiality as attorneys.  The 
AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct imposes a duty of confidentiality upon CPAs who 
are members. [FN329]  Members who breach these rules can lose their membership in 
the AICPA (not their license). [FN330]  However, most states have also adopted a *48
version of the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct. [FN331]  Breach under the 
licensing statute can result in loss of a CPA's license. [FN332]  However, "[u]nlike 
the oath attorneys take when sworn in as officers of the court, an accountant's duty 
of confidentiality is more limited, namely because of their role as an independent, 
objective party." [FN333]
  The accountant privilege, unlike the attorney-client privilege, "only applies 
during a trial or judicial proceeding." [FN334]  Since the work of the accountant is 
intended to be disseminated to third parties, usually there is a waiver of the 
accountant's duty of confidentiality. [FN335]  Generally, courts have stated that 
disclosing "tax information in a tax return . . . renders the privilege with respect 
to the tax preparation invalid because of waiver." [FN336]  A further limitation on 
the accountant privilege is that it only applies in regards to tax advice. [FN337]  
Tax advice is when an individual gives advice regarding a matter that is within the 
individual's scope authority. [FN338]  Since the Treasury Regulations do not give 
nonattorneys the right to practice law, and since the courts have held the giving of 
tax advice to be the practice of law, accountants cannot give tax advice, and this 
should render the privilege moot.
C. Prior Law
  Prior to enactment of Section 7525, [FN339] an accountant might have been 
protected by the accountant-client privilege if he was engaged to assist the 
attorney in advising and representing the attorney's client. [FN340]  This seems to 
be valid today as well.  If the accountant is *49 not retained to assist the 
attorney in providing legal advice, the rendering of legal advice is still the 
unauthorized practice of law if performed by an accountant.  If the accountant is 
retained to do tax return preparation, the privilege does not apply.  Thus, despite 
the passage of Section 7525, prior case law should continue to be good law.
  An "accountant can be retained by [an] attorney to clarify communications between 
[the] attorney and [the] client in order to assist [the] attorney in rendering legal 
advice." [FN341]  The privilege then attaches because the client's relationship is 
with the attorney, not the accountant. [FN342]
D. Supreme Court Cases
  Prior to the passage of the new legislation, the Supreme Court in Couch v. United 
States, [FN343] indicated that there was no accountant-client privilege for 
confidential communications with a client. [FN344]  The client attempted to assert 
an accountant-client privilege to prevent her accountant from producing business 
records which she had supplied to him for the preparation of her tax returns. 
[FN345]  The Court stated that "no confidential accountant-client privilege exists 
under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in federal 
cases. . . ." [FN346]
  In United States v. Arthur Young & Co. [FN347] the Court held that accountants did 
not possess a work-product privilege. [FN348]  The work-product privilege relates to 
materials and documents created by the attorney whereas, the attorney-client 
privilege relates to the admission of confidential communications between an 
attorney and the client in a trial or proceeding. [FN349]  The work-product 
privilege provides *50 that documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or 
trial are not discoverable without a showing of substantial need and undue hardship 
otherwise existing to obtain equivalent material. [FN350]  "[M]ental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories" included in documents are absolutely 
immune from disclosure, even if there is a showing of substantial need and undue 
hardship. [FN351]
  The Supreme Court held that the accountants from Arthur Young & Co. possessed no 
work-product privilege from disclosure in response to an IRS summons issued with 
respect to the tax accrual work papers prepared by the CPA in the course of regular 
financial audits. [FN352]  The Court focused on the potential conflict of interest 
which results when a CPA is granted a privilege. [FN353]  This conflict occurs when 
a CPA, who is supposed to be acting as an independent "public watchdog," takes on 
the role of an advocate (e.g., through tax consulting). [FN354]  The role of 
advocate requires a work-product, and communication privilege between an accountant 
and client. [FN355]  But, if those privileges are present, a CPA, who is supposed to 
issue a qualified or adverse opinion when he becomes aware of material matters which 
influence the opinion adversely, may fail to disclose the material issue because of 
privilege.  The Court stated that "[t]he independent public accountant performing 
this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and 
stockholders, as well as to the investing public." [FN356]  To successfully carry 
out its duties, "[t]his 'public watchdog' function demands that the accountant 
maintain total independence from the client. . . ." [FN357]  Thus, the privilege was 
denied. [FN358]
  In Upjohn, a drug manufacturer's general counsel was engaged in soliciting 
information from various employees for purposes of an internal investigation of 
possible illegal payments made to foreign *51 governments. [FN359]  The IRS was 
conducting a criminal tax investigation and attempted to compel the Upjohn attorneys 
to produce the questionnaires and interview notes from the internal investigation. 
[FN360]  Ultimately the Supreme Court held that communications with an attorney 
acting in a dual capacity as an attorney and as a business advisor could be 
privileged. [FN361]  According to the Court, the communications between the 
corporation's employees and the general counsel, which were evidenced both by the 
responses to questionnaires and by notes taken by the general counsel reflecting 
employee responses during interviews, were protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. [FN362] Accordingly, the IRS could not compel disclosure of such 
communications. [FN363]  The Court endorsed the application of the attorney-client 
privilege to corporations, but limited its application to only those communications 
related to the purpose of obtaining legal advice for the corporation. [FN364]  
Following Upjohn, communications made in reference to pure business matters do not 
enjoy the protection of the attorney-client privilege. [FN365]
  Attorneys who prepare clients' tax returns might assume that their notes, 
memoranda, work papers, and communications with clients are beyond the reach of a 
summons or subpoena by virtue of the attorney-client privilege.  This assumption 
finds some support from United States v. Euge, [FN366] in which the Supreme Court 
stated that the obligation to provide relevant and material evidence *52 to a tax 
investigation was "subject to the traditional privileges and limitations," including 
the attorney-client privilege. [FN367]
  The Supreme Court cases, however, have not specifically addressed the issue of 
whether an accountant is practicing law when practicing tax.  In Couch, for example, 
the client tried to assert an accountant-client privilege to prevent her accountant 
from producing business records she supplied to the accountant for the preparation 
of her tax returns. [FN368]  The Court simply stated that there was no accountant-
client privilege under federal law, and "no state-created privilege ha[d] been 
recognized in federal cases." [FN369]  Thus the Court did not address whether the 
accountant had been engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. [FN370]  Similarly, 
in Arthur Young the Court said there was no work-product privilege for tax accrual 
papers and launched into the accountant's dual obligations to the client and the 
public. [FN371]  In Upjohn, the Court applied the privilege to corporations and 
noted that matters purely business in nature have no privilege. [FN372] 
Comparatively, the Euge Court simply held that the obligation to provide relevant 
evidence in a tax investigation is still subject to the attorney-client privilege. 
[FN373]
  Accordingly, the distinction between attorney-client communications for legal 
advice and communications for business advice may be difficult to make, especially 
in the corporate context.  According to the Court in Upjohn, such decisions must be 
made on a case-by-case basis. [FN374]  Corporate communications are not entitled to 
privileged status merely because an attorney was involved. [FN375]  When an *53
attorney acts in a dual capacity-- e.g., as both general counsel and as an executive 
of the corporation--the analysis focuses on whether the communication at issue was 
legal in nature. [FN376]  Communications between an attorney and a client may 
contain both legal and nonlegal aspects, and such "mixed communications" can make 
the determination of privilege a difficult task. [FN377]  Attorneys engaged in tax 
return preparation, like their corporate counterparts, may find themselves acting in 
such a dual capacity by rendering both legal and non-legal tax advice.
  The federal courts have the right to determine who practices before them and what 
rules apply. [FN378]  The Supreme Court in Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar 
recognized a federal agency's right to determine which practitioners could appear 
before the agency and what those practitioners could or could not do. [FN379]  
Furthermore, the Treasury Department Circular 230, which governs practice before the 
IRS, specifically denies to nonattorneys the right to do anything that would 
constitute the practice of law. [FN380] Section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
however, grants a privilege to "tax practitioners" authorized under Circular 230 
when those practitioners are giving tax advice. [FN381]
  Presumably, a determination of whether or not a communication is legal in nature 
will turn on state or federal case law addressing what constitutes the practice of 
law.  Instead of focusing on the states' legal determinations of whether an activity 
constitutes the *54 practice of law, the federal courts have ignored the states' 
laws and have made their own determinations based on federal case law.
  Moreover, the federal courts have not established any bright line tests despite 
the numerous cases that have been decided. [FN382]  In order to be privileged, a 
requirement may be that the communication in question be "predominantly concerned" 
[FN383] with the rendering of legal advice, while some courts use the similar 
"primarily concerned" language. [FN384]  Another court has held that the attorney-
client privilege will attach to communications made for the purpose of obtaining (1) 
a legal opinion, (2) legal services, or (3) assistance in a legal proceeding. 
[FN385]
E. Decisions from the Courts of Appeal
  At the circuit court level, there have been numerous cases decided on the 
distinction between documents that represent the provision of a legal service and 
documents that are primarily related to accounting services. Generally, the circuit 
courts have classified the documents related to tax preparation work as primarily 
accounting-related, and thus unprivileged. [FN386]  Six circuits have held that 
there is no attorney-client privilege for work related to the preparation of tax 
returns by a lawyer. [FN387] Some have reached this *55 result by holding that the 
preparation of tax returns by an attorney is not the performance of legal services, 
but is instead account- ing service or "scrivener" work. [FN388]  Other courts 
reached their decisions by holding that the client waived the privilege of 
confidentiality because the client intended that all of the information communicated 
to the attorney be disclosed to the government in the tax return. [FN389]  Hence, in 
these circuits, theattorney-*56 client privilege will not attach to communications 
of this nature. [FN390]
  Most courts do not address the question of whether tax is the unauthorized 
practice of law.  Instead, they assume that accountants can practice tax and 
therefore look to see if there is a privilege.  The Fifth Circuit, however, did 
address the issue and found the practice of tax to be the practice of accounting. 
[FN391]  But when reconsidering the issue, the court indicated its reluctance to 
hold that tax practice by attorneys was not the practice of law [FN392] and opted 
instead to fall back on the waiver theory. [FN393]
  The Seventh Circuit tried to create a rule in Frederick that when attorneys are 
practicing tax, an accounting service, no privilege attaches. [FN394] Similarly, the 
documents created in connection with the preparation of the tax return are not 
communications subject to the attorney-client privilege. [FN395]  However, tax 
planning advice can constitute legal advice. [FN396]
  Six circuits have decided eight major cases on the issue of whether a client may 
rely on the attorney-client privilege when he has an attorney prepare his income tax 
returns.  The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Davis [FN397] and the Eleventh 
Circuit in In re Grand *57 Jury Investigation [FN398] held that preparation of tax 
returns by an attorney is an accounting service, not a legal service. [FN399]  
Similarly the Ninth Circuit reached the same result in United States v. Gurtner, 
[FN400] as did the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Lawless. [FN401]  On the 
other hand, in Canaday, the Eighth Circuit stated that tax return preparation does 
not rise to the level of an accounting service, but instead is merely scrivener 
work. [FN402]
  In addition, some courts have held that disclosure of general information on a tax 
return may waive the privilege with respect to details underlying the information. 
[FN403]  The waiver theory avoids the question of whether tax is the practice of 
law.
  In United States v. Cote, [FN404] for example, the Eighth Circuit adopted the 
waiver theory, [FN405] which subsequently became the basis for the decisions by the 
Seventh Circuit in Lawless, [FN406] the Fifth Circuit in United States v. El Paso 
Co., [FN407] and the Tenth Circuit in Dorokee Co. v. United States. [FN408]  Other 
courts, however, have held *58 that information the client does not intend to 
disclose remains privileged. [FN409]
  1. Second Circuit
  The court in United States v. Bohonnon [FN410] found that the names of clients for 
whom the attorney had prepared tax returns and copies of the returns were not 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. [FN411]  In addition, information 
transmitted to the attorney and intended by the client to be included in the tax 
return was not covered by the privilege. [FN412] Only the underlying legal advice or 
documentation could have been protected by the privilege. [FN413]
  Documents and tangible things that reflect the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, and legal theories of the attorney or other representative concerning 
litigation cannot be disclosed under any circumstances. [FN414]  A document is 
prepared "in anticipation of litigation" if the document is prepared because of the 
prospect of litigation. [FN415]  The Second Circuit specifically held that a 
document could be prepared "because of" possible litigation even though the 
litigation had not yet commenced and even though the transactions addressed by the 
document had not yet occurred. [FN416]  Thus, an analysis of the tax consequences of 
a proposed transaction may be protected by the work product doctrine if the taxpayer 
can prove that the analysis was prepared because of the threat of litigation. 
[FN417]
*59 Communications seeking advice or information from a third party in order to 
better advise the client do not constitute legal advice. [FN418] Communications 
regarding accounting or tax services do not constitute legal advice. [FN419]  What 
if the taxpayer is taking a position that is reasonable, but to which the IRS has 
not acquiesced?  Is that tax service?  Are the related papers associated with it "in 
anticipation of litigation" ?  Would they therefore be privileged?
  It is essential to document the relationship between the attorney, the accountant, 
and the client at the outset of the relationship. [FN420]  In the Second Circuit, 
representation of a taxpayer during an audit is accounting work as opposed to legal 
work. [FN421]
  2. Third Circuit
  In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, [FN422] the court held that the test is  "whether 
in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular 
case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of 
the prospect of litigation." [FN423]  After the accounting scandals related to 
Enron, Xerox, WorldCom, and other corporate giants, [FN424] and the new legislation 
regarding penalties for corporate fraud, [FN425] is it safe to say under this test 
that all audits, tax returns, and the underlying documents would qualify?
*60 In Lustman v. Commissioner, [FN426] the court reviewed a tax court decision 
that found a taxpayer had failed to report his tax liability correctly. [FN427]  The 
court refused to recognize any privilege in the taxpayer's confidential 
communications with his accountant, declaring that when records concerning tax 
liability were the subject matter of inquiry, Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue 
Code negated any privilege that might exist. [FN428]  The court said that 
confidential communications between a client and an accountant are not generally 
considered privileged at common law, and that there was no state or federal statute 
applicable that would confer such a privilege. [FN429]  Presumably, this would be 
exactly the kind of case to which the new Section 7525 privilege would apply.
  In United States v. Jaskiewicz, [FN430] the court concluded that "a State-created 
accountant-client privilege [was] not applicable in a Federal criminal trial." 
[FN431]  A taxpayer who was being prosecuted for tax evasion attempted to rely on a 
privilege created by a Pennsylvania statute in order to suppress his accountant's 
testimony and work papers. [FN432]  The court explained that, without a statute 
providing otherwise, there was no accountant-client privilege. [FN433]  Because the 
privilege deviated from the common law and was an exception to the general rule that 
anyone with knowledge of the facts is required to testify, a statute creating the 
privilege should be strictly construed. [FN434]  Thus, because the Pennsylvania 
statute, by its own provisions, was not to be applied in federal criminal trials, 
the court refused to uphold the privilege. [FN435]
*61 3. Fourth Circuit
  Whether an attorney is acting in a legal or a non-legal capacity depends on the 
purpose and nature of the communication. [FN436]  In United States v. Mancuso, 
[FN437] the IRS was prosecuting the taxpayer for tax evasion. [FN438]  The IRS sent 
for and extensively interviewed the accountant who had prepared the taxpayer's 
returns. [FN439]  The government obtained access to the accountant's entire file on 
the taxpayer, including net worth schedules prepared at the request of the 
taxpayer's defense counsel as well as letters from the defense counsel. [FN440]  The 
trial court suppressed the net worth statements and all related papers prepared by 
the accountant for use in the taxpayer's defense. [FN441]
  In response to the taxpayer's claim of a Fourth Amendment violation, the court 
noted that the Supreme Court had never allowed protection of a wrongdoer's misplaced 
belief that someone to whom the wrongdoer voluntarily confided wrongdoing would not 
reveal it, even though the taxpayer had entrusted the accountant only with tax 
records. [FN442]  There was no surreptitious invasion by a government agent into the 
legal camp of the defense, and the government did not engage in electronic 
surveillance, wiretapping, or deception. [FN443]  Thus, there was no government 
intrusion upon the confidential relationship between the taxpayer and his counsel. 
[FN444]  The court added that the government's deficiencies in the proper conduct of 
the prosecution were not erased by later notices to *62 counsel of what was done, 
but it was persuaded that wrongful intent was absent. [FN445]
  4. Fifth Circuit
  The court in United States v. Davis [FN446] recognized that materials were not 
privileged when they related to matters other than the giving of legal advice. 
[FN447]  Davis involved a suspected narcotics smuggler whose income tax returns, 
which showed little or no income, had been prepared for many years by Davis, an 
attorney who was also a CPA. [FN448]  The IRS issued summonses to Davis and his law 
partner, directing them to produce documents consisting mainly of the attorneys' 
records of financial transactions of the client. [FN449]
  The court noted that the attorney-client privilege was not available because 
preparation of tax returns by an attorney was not a legal service. [FN450] Although 
the preparation of tax returns may require some knowledge of the law, such 
preparation must be classified as primarily accounting, rather than legal, service. 
[FN451]  According to the court, a taxpayer should not benefit by hiring a lawyer to 
perform the same task that can be performed by an accountant but without the benefit 
of a federal privilege. [FN452]
  In United States v. El Paso Co., [FN453] the Fifth Circuit, after noting its 
holding in Davis, observed that "we would be reluctant to hold that a lawyer's 
analysis of the soft spots in a tax return and his judgments on the outcome of 
litigation on it are not legal advice." [FN454]  El Paso involved an audit of a 
major corporation, during which the IRS issued a summons requiring production of the 
company's *63 tax accrual work papers. [FN455]  Those work papers showed all the 
company's contingent tax liabilities. [FN456]  El Paso, however, claimed an 
attorney-client privilege over the documents. [FN457]
  After indicating its reluctance to rule that the lawyer's analysis in the case was 
not legal advice, the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to rule on that issue. 
[FN458]  Instead, the court found that the company had waived any privilege by 
disclosing the work papers and the potential tax liability issues to the independent 
auditors who certified the corporation's financial statements. [FN459]
  Work product protection applies as long as the primary motivation behind the 
creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation, [FN460] though 
the preparation of a tax return does not automatically give rise to an anticipation 
of litigation. [FN461]  There must be a concrete or identifiable reason to justify 
the anticipation of litigation. [FN462]
  When faced with specific fact patterns, the court keeps coming back to the 
conclusion that tax practice is the practice of law, and any blanket refusal of the 
privilege or statement that tax practice is the practice of accounting simply does 
not work.  However, the court is resistant to grant a privilege to accountants.  But 
instead of *64 holding that tax is the practice of law and therefore, accountants 
should not be practicing law, let alone be granted a privilege, the court resorts to 
other rationales.
  In Falsone v. United States, [FN463] for example, the court concluded that an 
accountant-client privilege created by statute did not apply to a tax investigation 
hearing before the IRS because an administrative proceeding rather than a civil 
action was involved. [FN464]  In Hayes v. United States, [FN465] the court stated 
that the accountant-client privilege under a state statute was not applicable to a 
federal criminal proceeding against a taxpayer for attempting to evade federal 
income taxes. [FN466]  At the trial, the court admitted into evidence statements of 
the taxpayer's accountant concerning the taxpayer's net worth. [FN467]  The Fifth 
Circuit said that because the taxpayer's accountant was acting within the scope of 
his employment and authority when he indicated his estimate of the extent of the 
taxpayer's cash reserves to the government agent, the accountant's statement was 
admissible against the taxpayer as an admission by an authorized agent. [FN468]
  In United States v. Lemlich, [FN469] the court summarily affirmed the judgment on 
a taxpayer's conviction for failing to file employer's quarterly tax returns. 
[FN470]  The court found no merit to the contention that the attorney-client 
privilege had been violated by asking the defendant whether his attorney, who held a 
power of attorney to represent him before the IRS, had asserted the defense that the 
defendant lacked the knowledge that he could file a return without a remittance. 
[FN471]
*65 5. Sixth Circuit
  In Brown v. United States, [FN472] the Sixth Circuit held that computation of a 
taxpayer's net worth based upon information provided by the taxpayer and made by the 
taxpayer's "auditor" was not privileged. [FN473]  Thus, the computational evidence 
was admissible in a prosecution against the taxpayer for attempting to evade income 
taxes. [FN474]
  The court in Gariepy v. United States [FN475] denied the existence of any 
privilege between an accountant and his client when the taxpayer, whose net worth 
had increased dramatically, claimed that he had received a gift of $50,000 but 
refused to reveal the donor. [FN476]  The taxpayer's accountant, who prepared his 
returns, assisted the IRS agents in their investigation and gave them the name of 
the alleged donor, thus making it possible for the government to "completely 
shatter" the taxpayer's gift defense. [FN477]  The evidence provided by the 
accountant was not privileged; [FN478] the court said that even if the accountant 
was in the employ of the taxpayer's counsel at the time he received and relayed the 
information to the investigators, there was respectable authority supporting denial 
of the accountant privilege. [FN479]
  6. Seventh Circuit
  In United States v. Frederick, [FN480] the court stated that "[w]hen a revenue 
agent is merely verifying the accuracy of a return, often with the assistance of the 
taxpayer's accountant, this is accountants' work and it remains such even if the 
person rendering the assistance is a lawyer rather than an accountant." [FN481]  The 
court also stated that an audit is unique as a possible predecessor to litigation as 
well as a stage in determining a taxpayer's liability. [FN482]  Taxpayers, *66
however, are usually represented by accountants in audits, and thus this work must 
be classified as accounting work, even when rendered by a lawyer. [FN483]  Only if a 
lawyer is assisting the taxpayer in the audit by dealing with issues of case law or 
statutory interpretation should privilege protect the documents. [FN484] Thus, 
because Frederick's work with regard to the audits did not fall within this latter 
category, the court found the audit-related documents to be unprivileged as well. 
[FN485]  The court also stated, however, that if the attorney is there "to deal with 
issues of statutory interpretation or case law that the revenue agent may have 
raised[,] . . . the lawyer is doing lawyer's work." [FN486]
  The court classified communication furnished by a person for the purpose of 
enabling the preparation of a tax return as communication that neither reflects the 
lawyer's thinking nor elicits his legal advice, [FN487] but it refused to assume 
that the client presented all of the information to Frederick in his role as a 
conduit to the IRS and not in his capacity as counsel. [FN488]  Additionally, the 
court rejected the argument that numerical information never falls within the 
attorney-client or work-product privileges. [FN489]  The court posited, for example, 
that a numerical figure, such as an estimate of damages, could reflect an attorney's 
thinking. [FN490]
 The court also considered the impact of Section 7525 on the issue.  [FN491]  This 
provision extends the attorney-client privilege to nonlawyers or "federally 
authorized tax practitioners" that practice in front of the IRS. [FN492]  This 
statute, according to the court, was intended to protect communications between the 
client and the federally *67 authorized tax preparer only to the extent that the 
same communication would be protected between a taxpayer and an attorney. [FN493]  
After indicating that nothing in the statute suggests an extension of the privilege 
to federally authorized tax practitioners when they are performing non-legal work, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the statute had no effect on the analysis already 
presented in the opinion. [FN494]  Thus, the court attempted to create a definition 
of when tax is the practice of law and what the role of the section 7525 "privilege" 
really is. [FN495]
  In United States v. Lawless, [FN496] the court found that information transmitted 
for the purpose of preparation of a tax return is not privileged information just 
because the recipient is an attorney rather than an accountant or tax preparer. 
[FN497]  The court based its decision on the general principles of the attorney-
client privilege that it had adopted in previous cases, including the requirement 
that the communication must come from a professional legal advisor acting in that 
capacity. [FN498]  Further, the court stated that claims of privilege are to be made 
and sustained on a question-by-question or document-by-document basis, and these 
clients will be strictly confined within narrow limits. [FN499]  The court explained 
that because the two documents at issue in this case were given to the attorney for 
the purpose of tax preparation and no other purpose, they were not related to the 
giving of legal advice, even assuming *68 that the attorney gave legal advice to the 
client. [FN500]  Therefore, the documents, although transmitted through an attorney, 
were not privileged communications. [FN501]
  The court, however, stopped short of holding that preparation of tax returns by an 
attorney was not a legal service.  Instead, it ruled in favor of the government 
because the two documents at issue contained information submitted in connection 
with the preparation of the estate tax return and that disclosure of tax information 
on the return "effectively waives the privilege 'not only to the transmitted data 
but also as to the details underlying that information."' [FN502]  Lawless, 
therefore, may properly be classified as a "waiver" case. [FN503]
  In United States v. Balistrieri, [FN504] the court held that a state statute 
creating an accountant-client privilege did not apply in a prosecution of a taxpayer 
for evading his income taxes. [FN505]  The court reasoned that the statute did not 
apply because (1) only federal law applies in a federal criminal tax prosecution, 
and (2) there is no accountant-client privilege in the federal system. [FN506]
  7. Eighth Circuit
  In Canaday, the Eighth Circuit held that an attorney, by completing a client's tax 
returns, did not act as a lawyer, but merely as a scrivener. [FN507]  Under these 
circumstances the attorney-client relationship was not established. [FN508]  Thus, 
any communications to the *69 attorney or documents in his custody concerning the 
tax return were not subject to the attorney-client privilege. [FN509]
  Canaday involved a taxpayer who was convicted on two counts of income tax evasion. 
[FN510]  On appeal, the taxpayer-defendant raised as error the trial court's refusal 
to suppress evidence because of the attorney-client privilege. [FN511]  The attorney 
who prepared the defendant's income tax returns testified as a government witness at 
the trial, despite the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress his testimony. 
[FN512]  After a hearing, the trial court found that the attorney had acted not as a 
lawyer, but "merely as a scrivener" for the defendant. [FN513]  Without much 
discussion or analysis, the Eighth Circuit simply adopted the reasoning of the trial 
court that the documents "were not of such a nature as to be the subject of the 
attorney-client privilege." [FN514]
  In United States v. Cote, [FN515] the taxpayers had employed a certified public 
accountant to prepare their tax returns for several years. [FN516] After the 
taxpayers received notification from the IRS that their returns were to be examined, 
the CPA referred them to an attorney. [FN517]  The attorney employed the CPA to 
conduct an audit of taxpayers' books, which was carried out in the attorney's 
office. [FN518]  After receiving the results of the audit, the attorney advised the 
taxpayers to file amended returns for the years under examination. [FN519]  The 
amended returns showed a greater amount of income than the previously-filed returns, 
but provided no explanation for the increase. [FN520]  The IRS issued summonses to 
both the *70 CPA and the attorney directing them to testify and to produce all work 
papers used in preparing both the original and amended returns. [FN521]
  The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the services performed by the attorney 
constituted legal advice, not accounting services. [FN522]  But the Eighth Circuit 
then held that the taxpayers waived the attorney-client privilege because "by filing 
the amended returns the taxpayers communicated, at least in part, the substance of 
that information to the government, and they must . . . disclose the detail 
underlying the reported data." [FN523]
  The court in Banks v. United States [FN524] held that no lawyer-client privilege 
existed when a taxpayer's attorney received a list of IRS questions for the 
taxpayer, after which the attorney provided those answers to the IRS. [FN525]  The 
attorney then served as a witness to identify the sheets containing the questions 
and answers, enabling the IRS to introduce those sheets into evidence in a 
prosecution of the taxpayer on charges of attempted tax evasion. [FN526]
  The court stated that the lawyer was not acting as a mere attorney, but was the 
taxpayer's agent. [FN527]  In that capacity, the attorney secured the taxpayer's 
answers to the previously submitted questions and returned them to the IRS 
representative. [FN528]  The court observed that the information requested was 
furnished by the taxpayer to his lawyer for the sole purpose of giving it to the IRS 
in response to their questions, and that the lawyer was therefore acting within the 
scope of his authority as the taxpayer's agent. [FN529]
  In United States v. Schlegel, [FN530] the court held that aside from the 
information incorporated into the return, and except for a plan on *71 the 
taxpayer's part to commit a crime or fraud, all of the information given to an 
attorney by a taxpayer for the purpose of having the attorney prepare the taxpayer's 
income tax returns was protected by the attorney-client privilege. [FN531]  The 
taxpayer's attorney informed an IRS agent that after he had prepared the taxpayer's 
return from summaries provided by the taxpayer, the taxpayer amended the summaries 
to show less income. [FN532]  The court stated that realistically a client intends 
that an attorney will conclude what amount of information should be conveyed to the 
government, and that the client intends the remainder of what he conveys to the 
attorney to be held in confidence. [FN533]  According to the court, "[a] different 
rule would not really support the purpose of the privilege, which is to encourage 
free disclosure of information by the client to the attorney." [FN534]  Thus, the 
court directed that the communications before the court were not to be admitted into 
evidence unless other evidence showed that, at the time of the communications with 
his attorney, the taxpayer knew or reasonably should have known that using the lower 
set of income figures would further a fraud or crime. [FN535]
  8. Ninth Circuit
  In Olender v. United States, [FN536] the Ninth Circuit stated that communications 
regarding business issues do not constitute legal advice. [FN537]  The court found 
no evidence that an attorney was employed as anything other than an accountant. 
[FN538]  Accordingly, no attorney-client privilege applied. [FN539]  Unfortunately, 
the court considered the net worth statement, which involves the application of 
accounting principles, and the tax return, which involves application of the tax 
law, in the same vain. [FN540]
*72 United States v. Gurtner [FN541] involved an appeal from a conviction for 
income tax evasion. [FN542]  The Ninth Circuit's opinion indicated that the 
defendant was advised by his attorney to consult with an accountant, and that the 
accountant and the attorney had a "working relationship." [FN543]  Gurtner's 
accountant testified at trial to Gurtner's detriment. [FN544]  Although Gurtner did 
not object to the accountant's testimony either before trial or while the accountant 
was on the stand, he later argued at trial and on appeal that his conversations with 
the accountant were privileged attorney-client communications. [FN545]  The Ninth 
Circuit held that a taxpayer's consultations with an accountant or tax attorney for 
the purpose of preparing tax returns were not privileged attorney-client 
communications. [FN546]
  The court explained that what was vital to the privilege was "that the 
communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from 
the lawyer," [FN547] and that if the client sought only accounting service, or if 
the client sought the accountant's advice rather than the lawyer's, no privilege 
existed. [FN548]
  Even if the accountant was an agent of the attorney, not all consultations with 
such agents are privileged. [FN549]  A taxpayer's consultations, even with an 
attorney who is preparing tax returns, are not privileged. [FN550]
  The court, however, held differently in United States v. Judson. [FN551]  In 
Judson, the taxpayer, who was under investigation for tax evasion, was directed by 
his attorney to prepare a net worth statement. [FN552] Accordingly, the taxpayer 
hired two accountants to prepare the statement. [FN553]  Thus, the net worth 
statement was prepared *73 at the direction of the attorney and delivered to him to 
enable him to render legal advice to his client relating to the pending tax 
investigation. [FN554]  The court affirmed the lower court's determination that the 
net worth statement and related work papers of the accountants were covered by the 
attorney-client privilege. [FN555]
  In Baldwin v. Commissioner, [FN556] the court held that the advice of an attorney 
to a client concerning the transfer of realty to the client's son to save probate 
expenses was privileged and inadmissible. [FN557]
  According to the court in Himmelfarb v. United States, [FN558] information gained 
by a tax accountant in a conference between an attorney and the clients when the 
accountant's presence was not indispensable is not privileged, even though the 
attorney hired the accountant. [FN559]  The court implied that information obtained 
by the accountant was not privileged regardless of whether the information was 
obtained by the accountant from the taxpayer, from discussions during meetings 
between the clients and their attorney at which the accountant was present, or from 
the attorney who had received the information from either or both of the clients. 
[FN560]
  In United States v. Hickok, [FN561] a taxpayer's records given to an accountant to 
allow the accountant to prepare tax returns were deemed unprivileged communications. 
[FN562]  The taxpayer knew that information in the records would be disclosed during 
the accountant's preparation of the returns; thus, the privilege did not apply. 
[FN563]  Further, a party may not disclose privileged attorney communications about 
a matter that is relevant and material to issues in a case *74 and then invoke a 
privilege to prevent discovery of other communications about the same matter. 
[FN564]
  9. Tenth Circuit
  In Dorokee Co. v. United States, [FN565] a grand jury subpoena duces tecum was 
directed to the taxpayers' attorney requiring the production of all "work papers, 
financial statements, and correspondence" relating to the preparation of the 
taxpayers' returns. [FN566]  Noting the Fifth Circuit's holding that preparation of 
tax returns by an attorney constituted an accounting service rather than a legal 
service, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow that lead, stating instead: 
    We need not resolve this issue here because the [taxpayers] have failed to 
establish their entitlement to the privilege.  Even those courts holding that the 
attorney-client privilege can arise from the preparation of income tax returns do 
not apply the privilege to documents given by a client to an attorney for inclusion 
in the client's income tax return, because such information is obviously not 
intended to remain confidential. [FN567]
  When a party asserts the attorney-client privilege because the documents to be 
produced could be incriminating to the client, courts measure the availability of 
the privilege by the degree to which the client would be protected by the Fifth 
Amendment from personally producing documents. [FN568]  In order to raise a Fifth 
Amendment privilege, the taxpayer must comply with the summons and then, at an 
appropriate time, claim the privilege applies to specific documents and the answers 
to individual questions. [FN569]  This objection must be based upon a reasonable
belief that compulsory response to those matters would "pose a substantial and real 
hazard of subjecting [the taxpayer] to criminal liability." [FN570]
*75 10. Eleventh Circuit
  In In re Grand Jury Investigation, [FN571] the court stated that information used 
in the preparation of a tax return should not be viewed as legal advice. [FN572]  
Glen Schroeder was the target of a grand jury investigation into charges of tax 
evasion. [FN573]  His tax return showed only a moderate income, but the government 
submitted evidence that showed he had purchased a house with a value of ten times 
his reported income for the year, and that he had paid for the house with a 
cashier's check purchased with cash. [FN574]  His attorney, who was also an 
accountant, had prepared Schroeder's income tax returns for many years, and had also 
performed other legal services for him, such as assisting him in setting up several 
offshore companies. [FN575]  When the grand jury subpoenaed that attorney to testify 
and produce documents relating to the preparation of the returns, Schroeder asserted 
the attorney-client privilege. [FN576]
  The Eleventh Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege was inapplicable 
because preparation of tax returns was not a legal service. [FN577]  Any information 
that a taxpayer gives to an attorney for the purpose of tax return preparation, 
including sources of income, does not constitute protected communication. [FN578]
  While the government acknowledged on appeal that an attorney-client relationship 
had in fact existed between the attorney and Schroeder with respect to matters other 
than tax return preparation, [FN579] the Eleventh Circuit determined that the 
"crime-fraud exception" to the attorney-client privilege vitiated the privilege. 
[FN580]  Because the government had shown a prima facie case of tax evasion, and 
because the attorney's advice had been in the broad sense *76 related to that tax 
evasion, the crime-fraud exception came into play to override the attorney-client 
privilege. [FN581]
F. Summary
  Regulation of the practice of law by the state is deemed critical.  [FN582]  There 
is, however, a growing body of federal law dealing with privilege that has tried to 
define the bounds of legal practice.  The federal courts have generally assumed that 
accountants can practice tax, and thus, when an attorney is practicing tax, the 
courts are not sure how to characterize it. The Fifth Circuit started by saying that 
if an attorney is practicing tax he must be practicing accounting, [FN583] but when 
the facts changed and the attorney was representing someone in a tax fraud case, it 
became obvious that aspects of tax must be the practice of law. [FN584]
  The courts, however, have generally not analyzed whether accountants should be 
practicing tax in the first place.  Because the federal courts have tried to limit 
the applicability of the accountant-client privilege, tax attorneys have seen a 
significant weakening of the attorney-client privilege.  Many of the decisions 
express concern that a taxpayer should not be able to gain greater protection from 
government information gathering by hiring an attorney. [FN585]  This is a tacit 
recognition that taxpayers use nonattorneys, and yet *77 none of the federal courts 
have taken notice of the fact that in many states this practice is the unauthorized 
practice of law.
  Federal courts retain the power to admit and to discipline members of their bar 
separately from admission and disciplinary procedures of state courts. [FN586]  
Furthermore, a federal court has the power to prescribe rules for the conduct of 
those who practice before it as long as the rules are consistent with the federal 
law and procedural and practice rules. [FN587]
  The Supreme Court has recognized that the commissioner of a federal agency has the 
authority to determine who can practice before the agency. [FN588] Despite 
permitting CPAs, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and selected others to 
practice before the office, Circular 230 includes language that "[n]othing in the 
regulations . . . may be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to 
practice law." [FN589]
  The question then is: Where do we look to find what constitutes the practice of 
law?  Because taxation is predominantly federal law, the federal courts should make 
this determination with respect to tax practice.  Unfortunately, unauthorized 
practice cases are seldom brought before federal courts because prosecution for the 
unauthorized practice of law is generally brought by a state or state bar 
association and is prosecuted under state law.  If it is the practice of law, the 
courts get to regulate it. [FN590]  If it is not the practice of law, the 
legislature gets to regulate it under its police power. [FN591]
*78 The federal courts, in trying to establish the boundaries of  "privilege" in 
federal tax cases, have fashioned rules that also impact on whether tax practice is 
or is not the practice of law in federal courts.  They have, however, fashioned a 
confusing and uncertain definition based on other criteria.  Unfortunately, this 
leaves taxpayers and tax practitioners in a perilous position.
V. Should Tax Practice Be the Practice of Law?
  Taxation deals so intimately with realization, interpretation, and integration of 
a huge body of law that practice in this area, of necessity, involves the practice 
of tax law.  Realistically, the courts could not hold otherwise.
  However, tax is an area in which the "practice of law" perhaps should not be 
reserved for attorneys alone, nor should all attorneys be allowed to practice in 
this area.  Thus, the field of taxation is unusual and should be viewed from its 
unique perspective.
A. Tax Practice by Attorneys--Law School Training
  Tax law is extremely complicated, pervasive, and intertwined.  Most litigation 
involves dollars and tax consequences and attorneys in any field where money is at 
issue need knowledge of tax laws or their advice and representation may result in 
malpractice. [FN592]
  For example, the courts of appeals are split on whether attorneys' contingency 
fees should be first taxed to the client and then *79 again to the attorney. [FN593]  
The tax courts' and the circuit courts' rulings that contingency fees can first be 
taxed to the client in their entirety and then the attorneys' fees portion will be 
taxed to the attorney may have a substantial impact on litigation. [FN594]  For 
example, if the client pays 35% on the recovery for federal tax and 9% for state 
tax, and the attorney gets 70% of the recovery when it goes to appeal, the client 
will pay out 114% of the recovery. [FN595]  Thus, the attorney will probably have to 
apprise the client that winning could be the worst case scenario because it could 
result in the client going in the hole by 14% of every dollar recovered. [FN596]  
This could put many plaintiffs in the dire position of owing more in taxes than they 
recover.  Thus, the tax consequences may not just impact contingency fee litigation, 
it could kill it!  Further, if the attorney then pays out 35% and 9% of the 70% 
portion that is his recovery, 88% of the recovery will be paid out as tax.  So why 
would anyone go through the agony of litigation?
  Attorneys practicing in family law cannot just rely on state family law statutes 
because every aspect of divorce carries serious tax consequences and could render an 
"equitable division" anything but equitable.  This is true of most aspects of 
litigation.  The tax consequences of all aspects of litigation and compliance work 
are significant and should be considered. Despite this pressure on attorneys to 
learn and know tax, the ABA has chosen to practically ignore tax in the required 
courses for attorneys.
  For a practitioner in tax, the requisite core of knowledge consists of 
approximately twelve areas: (1) individual income tax with tax accounting and timing 
issues; (2) corporate tax; (3) corporate reorganizations/*80 consolidations; (4) S 
corporation tax; (5) partnership tax; (6) estate and gift tax; (7) estate planning 
(including generation skipping tax); (8) pensions and profit sharing; (9) property 
transaction tax; (10) fiduciary income tax; (11) procedure before the IRS and tax 
litigation; and (12) international tax. [FN597]  These twelve areas of law are 
considered, by the authors, as necessary for a solid tax practitioner.
  Tax research may be included in the legal research course or may be offered as a 
separate offering.  Generally, tax classes are not required for a Juris Doctorate.  
Except in law schools offering a LL.M. in tax, many "tax lawyers" are graduating 
from law school with one or two tax classes, all of which are electives.  It is hard 
to imagine how ethical rules requiring competency could be met under the current 
educational standards.  Furthermore, tax is not an intuitive subject, nor one that 
can be easily learned independently.  A lawyer practicing in tax who has not been 
introduced to the broad range of laws may not even be aware of the issues to be 
researched.
  Fortunately, this is not the case, in schools offering an LL.M. in taxation.  
Those graduates generally have at least an introduction to the core of tax. [FN598]  
However, compliance and the requisite knowledge of arithmetic and accounting are 
often dismissed with the comment, "That's what accountants are for."  As a result, 
tax attorneys are often limited and timid about their ability to practice in the 
area of taxation.
*81 B. Early Controversy
  The 1940s saw a public conflict between attorneys and accountants over who should 
practice tax. [FN599]  Law schools were just starting to offer courses in the area, 
and as a general rule, attorneys were not trained in taxation. [FN600]  Despite the 
lack of training on the part of attorneys, however, the question of who should be 
allowed to practice in the area of taxation became a hotly contested issue.  In 
resolving the controversy, members of the bar generally acknowledged that 
accountants played a significant role in tax work. [FN601]  In Maurice Austin's 1951 
treatise entitled Relations Between Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants in 
Income Tax Practice, [FN602] the author noted the opinions of two prominent 
attorneys: 
    Tax work, as has often been pointed out, has been neglected by lawyers and the 
average lawyer does not know anything about it.  In most law firms of any size there 
are one or two men who are doing it, but the others don't know anything about it.
  The public will always consult the man who is supposed to know about taxes.  That 
is one reason why it is the settled practice of the community to go to the 
accountant. [FN603]
  If any lawyer needs proof of the importance and necessity of a certified public 
accountant, let him attempt to prepare an income-tax return for any corporation or 
partnership of any size.  The income-tax law, itself, bristles with legal questions, 
but the lawyer is rare who *82 can complete intricate returns without the help of an 
accountant of ability. [FN604]
  Austin further remarked, that until larger numbers of lawyers were trained in tax 
work, clients would continue to entrust their tax work to persons most familiar with 
the field. [FN605]  "In looking to the future," Austin advised, "it is well for 
lawyers to bear in mind that this condition is of their own creation, and that its 
correction requires changes in deeply ingrained habits of thought and practice for 
which they are in large part responsible." [FN606]  Austin's solution was two-fold: 
More tax training for attorneys and more joint effort between attorneys and 
accountants. [FN607]
  In an attempt to lessen the tension between the two professions, the National 
Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants adopted the Statement of 
Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal Income Taxation Statement. 
[FN608]  The Statement's purpose was to try to reach agreement between the two 
professions on the general principles. [FN609]  In addition, the drafters of the 
Statement wanted to remove the feud from the arena of public debate, and instead 
return it to the conference table. [FN610]
  The Statement provided that either accountants or lawyers could prepare federal 
income tax returns provided they consult the other when questions of accounting or 
law arise. [FN611]  In addition, if uncertainties arise as to the interpretation of 
tax law or general law, *83 these must be referred to an attorney; if the questions 
involved classifying and summarizing in terms of money, or interpreting the 
financial results, the taxpayer, or his lawyer, should retain an accountant. [FN612]
  According to the Statement, only attorneys may prepare or give advice about the 
sufficiency of legal documents. [FN613]  If questions arise involving the 
application of legal principles while representing taxpayers before the Treasury 
Department, the matter should be left to a lawyer. [FN614]  If, however, the 
questions involve accounting, summarization, classification, or interpretation of 
financial statements, the matter should be handled by an accountant. [FN615]  The 
Statement also discussed when an attorney or an accountant should be used before a 
tax court. [FN616]  Thus, the Statement closely followed the court decisions by 
stating that an accountant can fill out a tax return, but if a question of law 
arises, it must be resolved by an attorney. [FN617]
C. Tax Practice by the Accounting Profession
  Despite what appeared to be an established state of the law on what constituted 
the unauthorized practice of law in the tax area, accountants had other ideas.  
Generally, accountants already provide legal services with tax advice, [FN618] and 
the level of tax practice in which accountants engage often far exceeds the 
parameters set down by the courts. [FN619]  Further, recent events surrounding the 
accounting scandals of Enron, Xerox, and WorldCom have shown *84 that without 
adequate supervision and controls, the practice of law in the areas of accounting 
and tax have the potential of doing great harm. [FN620]
  Although the law has been established by the courts, it would appear that no one 
truly believes it is the law; consequently, the law is not enforced.  The accounting 
profession does not believe it is the law, so accountants continue to not only 
practice in this area, but to expand their practices into other areas of "law" as 
well. [FN621]  The public does not believe it is the law either, as can be seen by 
the large numbers of taxpayers who seek the assistance of an accountant, rather than
an attorney, to get tax advice and have their taxes done. [FN622]  The tacit 
approval of the bar has led accountants to believe that the practice of tax falls 
within the purview of the accounting profession, and the failure to enforce the law 
has led accountants to believe they are a law unto themselves.
  Since the early 1990s the largest accounting firms have been practicing law in 
Europe. [FN623]  It is also the consensus of many that these same firms are also 
horning into the legal market here in the United States. [FN624] This has created a 
stage for an upcoming battle between lawyers and accountants. [FN625]  Further, the 
"fight promises *85 to be divisive" as many of the large accounting firms have begun 
to recruit lawyers from firms and law schools. [FN626]
  CPAs are regulated by state boards of accountancy. [FN627]  These boards are 
charged with enforcing and interpreting the rules governing the licensing and 
regulation of CPAs. [FN628]  The minimum licensing requirements generally include 
passing the Uniform CPA Examination (which has very little to do with tax 
knowledge), educational requirements (which require very little tax), experience 
(which may have nothing to do with tax), continuing professional education, and peer 
review (not applicable in the tax area). [FN629]  AICPA, has promulgated a Code of 
Professional Conduct and Statements on Responsibility in Tax Practice. [FN630]  The
Statements establish standards for tax practice and define the responsibility of 
CPAs, but they only apply to members of the AICPA. [FN631]  These standards are not 
mandatory and carry no sanction for their breach. [FN632]
  Additionally Circular 230 is a codification of the laws imposed upon those 
practicing tax before the IRS. [FN633]  Circular 230 imposes a number of duties and 
restrictions. [FN634]  The Treasury Department has the authority to suspend or 
disbar a person from practicing before it for incompetence, disreputable conduct, or 
violation of statutes *86 or regulations. [FN635]  The Internal Revenue Code also 
provides penalties for tax return preparers who breach the rules or break the law. 
[FN636]
  Probably the most disturbing aspect of practice by accountants is that they have 
done nothing to dispel the public's misconception that the designation, "CPA," means 
tax. [FN637]  In fact, not only have they done nothing to explain that the CPA 
designation does not mean tax expertise, they have continued to perpetrate the 
misconception.  With all the scandals currently surrounding the accounting firms, 
their lack of full disclosure about their actual preparation in tax is disturbing. 
[FN638]
VI. The Legal Profession's Obligation to Regulate the Practice of Law
  Despite the obligation of the legal profession to regulate the practice of law, it 
has taken relatively few steps to restrain the unauthorized practice of law in the 
area of taxation.  Many of the cases have arisen sporadically when an accountant 
sued for fees, or when an attorney became disgruntled with an accountant.  Whether 
an accountant is restrained from practicing tax, may be determined by whether he 
alienates an attorney.  Thus, a tax accountant's right to practice tax may be 
capriciously determined by his social skills rather than his competency in the tax 
area.
  As competition for clients and business has increased, accountants and attorneys 
have begun working together to help promote business.  Thus, unless an attorney is 
representing a client in defending a suit for fees, attorneys do not want to 
alienate a potential source of work!
*87 A. Participation in Fraud on the Accountant
  By not taking a stand on the unauthorized practice of law in the tax area, 
however, the legal profession has opened up the possibility of participating in an 
unwitting fraud on accountants.  If an accountant sues for fees earned from giving 
tax advice, the client can get out of paying the fees by simply asserting that the 
advice constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.  The recalcitrant client might 
very well be an attorney or judge.
  Further, if a client is suing for malpractice, the fact that the accountant is 
guilty of the unauthorized practice of law will weigh heavily against him. The 
situation is so egregious that many malpractice carriers use clauses that void 
coverage if the accountant sues for fees.
B. Ethical Obligations of the Legal Profession
  In spite of their reluctance to take a stand against accountants on the 
unauthorized practice of law issue, attorneys are under an ethical obligation to do 
so.  The older ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility established ethical 
standards which are to govern the actions of attorneys engaged in the practice of 
law. [FN639]  Canon 3 is entitled "A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law." [FN640]  Model Rule 5.5 of the Model *88 Rules of 
Professional Conduct states that a lawyer shall not assist another in the 
unauthorized practice of law. [FN641]
  By failing to firmly establish that tax is the unauthorized practice of law, the 
legal profession has also created a trap for accountants.  More than two-thirds of 
the states make the unauthorized practice of law a misdemeanor by statute. [FN642]  
Others consider it contempt of court. [FN643]  However, accountants cannot provide 
competent tax services without dealing with legal matters, [FN644] and thus, 
practicing law under the current standards.  As Judge Pennington Straus, the former 
Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on National Conference Groups, stated, "all 
kinds of other professional people are practicing the law almost out of necessity." 
[FN645]
  The ABA Commission on Professionalism stated, "It can no longer be claimed that 
lawyers have the exclusive possession of the esoteric knowledge required and are 
therefore the only ones able to advise clients on any matter concerning the law." 
[FN646]  However, under the current standards, nonlawyers do so at their peril.
*89 Even if accountants and attorneys work together in the area of tax or estate
planning, the potential is great for the ethical standard of the legal profession to 
become severely strained.  Since many attorneys are not competent to "crunch" the 
numbers, it is important for attorneys to have a good working relationship with an 
accountant.  This relationship may be destroyed if the attorney refuses to 
participate in the estate planning business of the accountant or takes the position 
that the accountant should not be practicing tax.
  Unless the legal profession as a whole takes a stand against practice by 
accountants and its continued encroachment into the most complex areas of taxation 
and estate planning, either the ethics of the profession, or the service provided to 
the client will suffer.  On the other hand, if the legal profession and the public 
determine that it is best to allow accountants to practice in the areas of taxation 
and estate planning, this needs to be clearly set out so that accountants can 
practice within the parameters of the law.
  From a practical perspective, not enough trained lawyers (in tax or otherwise) 
exist to do the tax work now performed by accountants. [FN647] Thus, if the legal 
profession suddenly began to enforce the unauthorized practice of law in tax, it 
would create chaos.  This was the same situation that existed in the 1940s. [FN648]  
Despite the call for better training for attorneys in the field of taxation, the 
situation has not dramatically changed since the earlier controversy. [FN649]  
Therefore, although the state courts have adamantly declared tax practice to be the 
practice of law, the legal profession simply cannot enforce the courts' stand.
VII. Proposal for Change
  Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct deals with a lawyer's 
obligation to assist in the integrity and competence of *90 the legal profession. 
[FN650]  Perhaps it is time for the courts and the legal profession to take a new 
look at their obligation in the area of tax practice.
  In 1985, after a struggle regarding the preparation of real estate documents by 
nonlawyers, the Washington Supreme Court held that licensed real estate brokers or 
sales agents could prepare lawyer-approved forms as long as those individuals were 
held to the same standard of care as attorneys. [FN651] The court, after considering 
the interests of consumers in reduced costs and increased convenience, and the 
interest of other licensed vocations in using the broker's expertise, stated: "We no 
longer believe that the supposed benefits to the public from the lawyers' monopoly 
on performing legal services justifies limiting the public's freedom of choice." 
[FN652]  Other trends have encouraged nonlawyers to respond to this unmet demand.  
An increasing specialization in legal work, coupled with a growing reliance on 
paralegals and routinized case-processing systems, undercuts some of the traditional 
competence-related justifications for banning lay competitors.  Law school and bar 
exam requirements provide no guarantee of expertise in tax preparation, areas where 
the need for low-cost services is greatest. [FN653]
  An ABA survey of clients reported that 82% of respondents agreed that "many things 
that lawyers handle--for example, tax matters or estate planning . . . can be done 
as well and less expensively by nonlawyers." [FN654]
  With the legal community beginning to recognize the practical realities of 
nonlawyers practicing law, various steps are being taken to deal with this 
situation. [FN655]  The most common approaches exempt lay legal practice that is 
widespread in the community, incidental *91 to another established business, or only 
routine tasks requiring knowledge of an average citizen. [FN656]
  By focusing on the nature of the task rather than the skills of the provider, this 
approach fails to adequately acknowledge consumer concerns.  Typically, courts 
determine what tasks are beyond an average individual's grasp without reference to 
any evidence that offending practitioners have only average knowledge or have harmed 
the public by their activities.
  Following the new trends, it would be possible for the courts to establish a new 
standard for the practice of tax.  The courts could consider making an exception to 
the unauthorized practice of law for tax practitioners who demonstrate exceptional 
knowledge and agree under the supervision of the courts.
A. Qualifications to Practice "Law" in the Tax Area
  1. Education
  The first criterion for allowing nonlawyers to practice tax would be the 
demonstration of exceptional knowledge, and it should be defined in terms of current 
standards required by the courts.  However, in establishing this standard, it should 
apply to attorneys practicing tax as well.
  The body of knowledge required to competently practice tax is enormous.  It takes 
proficiency in twelve areas of knowledge to cover the basic core of the subject 
matter. [FN657]  In addition, there are numerous specialty areas. [FN658]  Further, 
the complexity of the administrative procedures is overwhelming.
*92 Generally, neither attorneys nor accountants has had adequate educational 
preparation to practice tax. [FN659]  The accountant frequently has had only one 
business law course as part of his accounting program.  He will probably not be well 
versed in the laws of business organizations, trusts, wills and estates, contracts, 
or other business topics, nor will he have had exposure to constitutional law or 
criminal procedure.  However, after years of experience under the tutelage of an 
experienced tax accountant, the accountant probably will acquire the required 
knowledge and expertise to function competently in taxation.
  On the other hand, a student in a J.D. program may not be required to take any tax 
courses. [FN660]  The attorney starting a tax practice may have had only the same 
two tax classes as the accountant.  In addition, since the tax law student is seldom 
required to know how to do any of the computations relating to tax issues, he may be 
incapable of actually computing the tax consequences of an intended tax plan. 
[FN661]
  An attorney with nothing more than the ABA required courses is not qualified to 
practice tax.  Tax is such a complicated and interrelated area, it is not enough to 
simply research a tax question.  First, it is necessary to know that there is an 
issue.  Although an attorney may be able to find a definitive answer with respect to 
the question posed, his answer may impact numerous other tax issues of which he and 
the client are unaware, and which will not be apparent from the attorney's research.  
Thus, competency requires much more than research skills or a broad background in 
peripheral legal issues.
  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility define competent professional 
judgment as "the product of a trained familiarity with law and legal processes, a 
disciplined, analytical approach to legal problems, and a firm ethical commitment." 
[FN662]  In *93 tax practice competent professional judgment requires trained 
familiarity with the tax law and tax procedures, a disciplined, analytical approach 
to tax problems and their numerous ramifications, and a firm ethical commitment.  
The required training simply is not part of a regular program in law leading to the 
juris doctorate degree. [FN663]  However, after years of tutelage under a competent 
tax attorney and/or after an LL.M. program in tax, an attorney may possess the 
required abilities.
  Recently, the ABA formed the Taskforce on the Model Definition of the Practice of 
Law. [FN664]  The taskforce recognized that: 
    [A] lawyer serves the complex role as a representative of clients, an officer of 
the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality 
of justice.  The lawyer's complex role includes special obligations such as client 
confidentiality, conflicts avoidance, competent performance and professional 
independence that underscore the need for a comprehensive system of minimum 
qualifications for admission to the practice of law.  The principal objective of the 
qualification system is to ensure that education, training, examination and fitness 
criteria are satisfied prior to admission and licensing.  Thereafter, the 
jurisdiction's regulatory system monitors the ethical conduct and competency of 
lawyers through an extensive system of professional continuing education, periodic 
registration, professional conduct rules and professional liability standards, and 
disciplinary enforcement. [FN665]
  Unfortunately, the taskforce did not address a situation in which the attorney is 
not competent to practice in the first place, or the definitions of who can practice 
that apply evenly to large firms and local solo practitioners. [FN666]
  So exactly who is qualified to do tax or estate planning or give tax advice?  The 
average attorney with a J.D. has a general knowledge of the law, and the legal 
ramifications of corporations, partnerships, estates, trusts, wills, and contracts.  
He may also have a *94 basic understanding of individual taxation, business entities 
or estate and gift taxation, but when faced with other tax issues, the expertise of 
the attorney may fall short of the level demanded by the ABA Model Rules. [FN667]
  On the other hand, a CPA is qualified in areas of auditing and advising 
management, with some experience with taxation.  However, even if the CPA is 
knowledgeable in taxation, he will probably lack the knowledge of the legal issues 
relating to estate, business, or tax planning.
  It is possible that under the existing standards and educational programs, neither 
accountants nor attorneys should be allowed to practice tax unless some additional 
standard is imposed.  The concept of additional entrance requirements to practice in 
a field of law is not new. [FN668]  For example, patent attorneys are required to 
pass an examination before they are allowed to practice as "patent" attorneys. 
[FN669]
  In 1983, the American Taxation Association proposed making a certification for tax 
specialists. [FN670]  This certification would have given the client a tool to help 
determine which practitioners had achieved a certain level of competency in the area 
of taxation.  The proposal was opposed by accounting tax practitioners and the 
accounting academicians. [FN671]
  Steps have been taken in several of the states to allow attorneys who have met 
test and experience requirements to hold themselves out as "specialists" in various 
areas. [FN672]  Attorneys who have not *95 met the requirements can still practice 
in the specialty areas, but they cannot hold themselves out as "specialists." 
[FN673]
  Since the courts have the ultimate authority to regulate the practice of law, any 
standard imposed upon practitioners before they can practice tax must be imposed by 
the courts.  Until the courts impose a standard of education, the public will not be 
guaranteed a pool of qualified practitioners in the area of tax practice.
  2. Regulation by the Courts
  Perhaps it is time for the legal profession to reevaluate its responsibility 
regarding the practice of law in the area of tax.  The legal profession alone does 
not have the qualified manpower to meet the public demand for tax advice. [FN674]  
On the other hand, the profession has the responsibility for making sure that the 
public is served by competent, ethical practitioners.  Its reluctance to take a firm 
and definitive stand on the practice of tax has subjected the public to essentially 
unregulated tax practitioners.
  In Gardner v. Conway, [FN675] the court said: 
    Any criterion for distinguishing law practice from that which belongs to other 
fields can be properly geared to the public welfare only if we keep in mind the 
manner in which the licensing of lawyers serves its purpose.  The law practice 
franchise or privilege is based upon the threefold requirements of ability, 
character, and responsible supervision.  The public welfare is safeguarded not 
merely by limiting law practice to individuals who are possessed of the requisite 
ability and character, but also by the further requirement that such practitioners 
shall thenceforth be officers of the court and subject to its supervision. [FN676]
  The courts could make the practice of tax by either accountants or attorneys 
subject to its supervision.  By so doing, the courts would have the disciplinary 
power that is deemed to be important to the public welfare.
*96 B. Recommendation
  Reform and change accompany any recommendation for the future.  First, enjoining 
nonlawyers from tax practice would require a vast increase in the number of 
practicing tax attorneys.  It would also require a complete change in the education 
provided in law schools so that upon graduation, these professionals could give 
competent tax advice.  Further, a significant portion of the state bar associations' 
time would go to prosecuting the myriad number of nonlawyer tax practitioners and 
firms.  Second, giving the business of taxation solely to the CPAs would mean the 
loss of privileged client communications, court control of disciplinary actions, and 
the problem of malpractice due to a lack of adequate educational standards. [FN677]  
Third, a requirement that both professionals work together involves fee sharing, the 
possibility of client fraud, and the doubling of fees to the client for two 
professionals.  However, the level of competency would rise.
  Perhaps it is time to consider a new alternative.  We propose creating a new 
classification which could be called "Tax Practitioner."  Tax Practitioners could 
have a background in either law or accounting, but would become certified as a Tax 
Practitioner only after satisfactory completion of course work in specific areas and 
an examination demonstrating competency in the numerous areas of taxation, including 
related law.  An experience requirement could also be imposed before the 
practitioner could practice on his own.  To ensure continuing competency, a 
requirement of re-testing every five years or completion of a number of hours of 
continuing education could be imposed.  These new practitioners would have the same 
requirements of character imposed upon members of the bar and would be subject to 
supervision and discipline by the courts.  In effect, a new "bar association" could 
be created for Tax Practitioners.
  These new professionals would be allowed to practice in the area of taxation by 
giving advice, rendering opinions, representing clients before taxing agencies, 
completing the same kind of exam now administered by the tax court to nonattorneys, 
and prosecuting tax *97 cases in any court in which the practitioner has met the 
requirements for practice.
  In addition, a second classification called "Tax Preparer" could be established 
for those who have not met the qualifications of the Tax Practitioner.  Tax 
Preparers would be allowed to fill out tax returns; however, they would be required 
to pass an exam and complete annual continuing education requirements.  They would 
not be allowed to give tax advice unrelated to the preparation of the return.  Of 
the four areas of tax practice, [FN678] they would be limited to preparing only tax 
returns.
  Since the regulation of the practice of law rests with the courts, both groups 
would be created by adoption of a set of court rules.  Two scenarios are possible.  
The first would be to create a model set of court rules to be adopted by the highest 
court in each state.  Each Tax Practitioner or Tax Preparer would apply for 
membership in a state's Tax Bar.  This proposal gives each state control over the 
practice of law within its borders, but creates the possibility of disparate 
treatment of practitioners engaged in federal law.
  The other scenario would be a National Tax Bar, created and governed by the United 
States Supreme Court.  Each admitted applicant would then be empowered to practice 
nationwide.
  By establishing a new type of tax practitioner, the public would have some 
assurance of at least a minimal level of education and competency in the area of 
taxation.  We are long overdue for some standard regulating the entrance 
requirements and continuing competency level in this field.  In addition, by 
establishing a new type of Tax Practitioner, we could legitimize the practice of tax 
by those nonlawyers who have achieved the competency to practice in this area.
VIII. Conclusion
  Taxation is a field that is so pervasive that its effect is felt by practically 
all people.  In fact, the ramifications of taxation can be so devastating that they 
can literally destroy businesses and disrupt families. Superimposed upon the 
monetary effects of taxation, are the potential criminal penalties for willful 
failure to comply with a maze of complex and practically unintelligible rules.
*98 Despite the critical need for competent, professional help in the area of 
taxation, the current state of tax practice is confused, virtually unsupervised, and 
without definite standards for practitioners. [FN679]
  Accountants who do a great deal of the tax practice in this country have refused 
to create a certification that would protect the public and ensure a high level of 
competency among practitioners in the area of taxation.  Despite their reluctance to 
demand a high standard of competency, they have begun to move into additional areas 
of "law" in an effort to expand their practice.
  The state courts have said that the practice of tax is the practice of law, and as 
such is subject to its supervision.  Presumably, these decisions establish the law 
that only lawyers can practice tax, but these holdings are flaunted and not 
enforced.  Further, enforcement would bring about chaos and be to the public 
detriment, as there are not enough lawyers to do the work done by accountants.  The 
federal courts are split on the issue, but generally hold that the practice of tax 
is the practice of accounting, even when performed by an attorney.  Generally, their 
rulings are not so much an analysis of whether tax is the practice of law, as they 
are an effort to limit the use of an accountant-client privilege.  Thus, although 
the states hold the practice of tax is the practice of law, the federal courts 
generally hold that the practice of tax is the practice of accounting unless it 
involves a criminal prosecution.
  Accountants practicing tax, however, do so under the threat of prosecution for the 
unauthorized practice of law under state law.  Since there is no one else to do a 
job that is in such critical demand, this threat of prosecution is an unfair burden 
to put upon the accounting profession.
  It is time for the legal profession to set realistic standards ensuring the public 
welfare in terms of providing both sufficient and competent tax assistance.  This 
can be done by creating a new classification of professionals who must meet 
standards of competency in the areas of taxation and who are supervised by the 
courts.
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Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 496, 498 (D. Kan. 1994) (recognizing the 
same burden on the party seeking the tax returns).
[FN296]. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
[FN297]. Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
[FN298]. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
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supersede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a 
compelling reason").
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[FN324]. I.R.C. ß  7525(a)(1) (1998).  This privilege may not be asserted in 
criminal tax matters.  Id. ß  7525(a).
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States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981) (characterizing preparation of 
tax returns as primarily an accounting service).
[FN387]. See United States v. Borstein, 977 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 
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communications made by the client to his attorney were "for the sole purpose" of 
transmitting them to state taxing authorities); cf. United States v. El Paso Co., 
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that "a taxpayer must not be allowed, by hiring a lawyer to do the work that an 
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Practice and Procedure ß  2024, at 343 (1994), and noting that this is the rule used 
also in the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. circuits).
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(7th Cir. 1963) (adopting the general principle of an attorney-client privilege that 
says legal advice given by a professional advisor in confidence to his client makes 
the communication privileged).
[FN499]. See Lawless, 709 F.2d at 487 (explaining that "a blanket claim of privilege 
is unacceptable").
[FN500]. See id. (stating that no evidence was introduced to establish that the 
documents were for any other purpose).
[FN501]. Id. at 488.
[FN502]. Id. (citing United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972)).
[FN503]. See also United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(denying attorney-client privilege to information transmitted to a party with the 
intent that the party use the information to explain to the IRS the disparity 
between estate tax and income tax returns); Webster v. United States, No. 85-3109, 
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1983) (finding that, as a general rule, a client's communications to a lawyer 
related to preparation of an income tax return are not made for the purpose of 
seeking "legal advice" within meaning of attorney-client privilege).




[FN514]. Id. at 857 n.7 (articulating the findings of the trial court).
[FN515]. 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
[FN516]. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 143 (8th Cir. 1972)  (holding that the 
taxpayer waived attorney-client privilege regarding working papers when the tax 





[FN521]. Cote, 456 F.2d at 143-44.
[FN522]. Id. at 144.
[FN523]. Id.  The accountant testified that the data from the work papers was 
transcribed onto the amended returns that were filed with the government. Id. at 
145.  This disclosure, according to the court, waived the privilege to the 
transmitted data as well as the underlying details.  Id.
[FN524]. 204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1953), vacated on other grounds, 348 U.S. 905 
(1955).
[FN525]. Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 1953), vacated on other 
grounds, 348 U.S. 905 (1955).
[FN526]. Id.
[FN527]. Id.
[FN528]. Id. (recognizing that "whatever an agent does or says ... within the scope 
of his authority, is done or said by the principal").
[FN529]. Id.
[FN530]. 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970).
[FN531]. United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177, 179-80 (D. Neb. 1970).
[FN532]. Id. at 178.
[FN533]. Id. at 179.
[FN534]. Id.
[FN535]. Id. at 181.
[FN536]. 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
[FN537]. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1954).
[FN538]. Olender, 210 F.2d at 806.
[FN539]. Id. at 806.
[FN540]. Id.
[FN541]. 474 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973).
[FN542]. United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1973).
[FN543]. Id.
[FN544]. See id. (recognizing Gurtner's assertion that the attorney's testimony 
should be stricken from the record).
[FN545]. Id. at 298-99.
[FN546]. Gurtner, 474 F.2d at 299 (citing Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 
806 (9th Cir. 1954), and Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 
1966)).
[FN547]. Id. at 298.
[FN548]. Id. at 299.
[FN549]. Id.
[FN550]. Id.
[FN551]. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
[FN552]. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963).
[FN553]. Id.
[FN554]. Compare United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963) (noting 
that the accountant's role when preparing the statement was to facilitate an 
accurate consultation between the client and attorney about the client's financial 
status), with United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(indicating that consultations between the client and an accountant for purposes of 
preparing returns are not privileged).
[FN555]. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963).
[FN556]. 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942).
[FN557]. Baldwin v. Comm'r, 125 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1942).
[FN558]. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).
[FN559]. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949)  (concluding 
that the accountant's presence was a convenience).
[FN560]. See id. at 939 (considering it unnecessary to determine the factual basis 
behind preparation of the documents in question).
[FN561]. 481 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1973).
[FN562]. United States v. Hickok, 481 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1973).
[FN563]. Id.
[FN564]. See Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 
(9th Cir. 1981) (finding the privilege waived when a party disclosed the content of 
a privileged communication that was relevant and material to an issue before the 
court).
[FN565]. 697 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1983).
[FN566]. Dorokee Co. v. United States, 697 F.2d 277, 278 (10th Cir. 1983).
[FN567]. Id. at 280.
[FN568]. See United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467, 1470 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1975)).
[FN569]. Id. at 1474; United States v. Schmidt, 816 F.2d 1477, 1482  (10th Cir. 
1987).
[FN570]. Clark, 847 F.2d at 1474 (emphasis omitted) (citing Hoffman v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
[FN571]. 842 F.2d 1223 (11th Cir. 1987).
[FN572]. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 1987).
[FN573]. Id. at 1224.
[FN574]. Id. at 1227.
[FN575]. Id. at 1224, 1227 n.5.
[FN576]. Id. at 1224.
[FN577]. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1225.
[FN578]. See id. (expounding that "[a] taxpayer should not be able to invoke a 
privilege simply because he hires an attorney to prepare his tax returns").
[FN579]. Id. at 1225.
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(2004) (recognizing the court split and holding that the contingency fees were 
excludable).
[FN594]. See generally Gregg D. Polsky, Essay, The Contingent Attorney's Fee Tax 
Trap: Ethical, Fiduciary Duty, and Malpractice Implications, 23 Va. Tax Rev. 615 
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http:www.irs.gov/app/vita/content/basic/// 
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